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The Courts and Foreign Affairs at the Founding
Kevin Arlyck ∗
INTRODUCTION
In 1793 the Washington administration had a problem.
Revolutionary France had recently declared war against Great Britain
and several other European powers; what had formerly been a landbased conflict for continental supremacy was now spilling across the
Atlantic. As the United States was both militarily weak and
economically vulnerable, maintaining neutrality in the expanding
conflict was the administration’s top priority.
The belligerents were not cooperating. Claiming that treaties
dating to the American Revolution gave France the right to license
and arm private military vessels in the United States, French officials
launched a wave of maritime attacks against British commerce from
American shores. In response, Britain insisted that the United States,
as a neutral nation, had an obligation to stop such predations and
restore captured property to its owners—or face retaliation. Fully
convinced of the necessity of remaining neutral in the expanding
conflict, the Washington administration was in a quandary: How to
respond to the demands of one belligerent without giving offense to
the other.
The answer lay in the courts. In contrast to standard presidentialist
accounts of how institutional responsibility for foreign affairs was
distributed among the branches of the nascent federal government,
this Article demonstrates that during the nation’s first major foreign
affairs controversy following ratification—known as the Neutrality
Crisis—the Washington administration actively sought to enlist the
help of the federal judiciary in managing a diplomatic emergency with
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dangerous implications. In particular, cabinet officials argued to
skeptics at home and abroad that judicial resolution of disputes over
British vessels captured by French privateers was consistent with both
domestic constitutionalism and customary international practice. In
so doing, the administration sought to transform a sensitive
controversy over the nature of sovereign rights in wartime into a series
of ordinary legal disputes over private property—disputes that the
Constitution, Thomas Jefferson insisted, “ascribed to the
Judiciary alone.” 1
Jefferson’s claim may sound odd to modern readers, accustomed
as we are to debate on the role of the courts in foreign affairs that
generally presupposes an opposition between judicial decisionmaking
and presidential policymaking. That was decidedly not the view of the
Washington administration, which understood independent judicial
resolution of disputes implicating the rights of foreign sovereigns to
be supportive of rather than inimical to executive branch objectives.
Because the executive branch lacked the institutional capacity to
respond effectively to British demands for interdiction of French
privateering, the administration sought to demonstrate the new
government’s commitment to fulfilling the United States’ obligations
as a neutral nation by leveraging the courts’ particular structural
advantages. More importantly, pushing the controversy into the
courts served as a means of deflecting responsibility for resolution of
a highly sensitive diplomatic problem away from the executive. As
Edmund Randolph, Jefferson’s successor as Secretary of State,
explained to a judge in the midst of the Crisis, the administration’s
view was that “the judiciary [was] in great measure combined with the
Executive in the promotion of harmony between the United States
and foreign nations.” 2
The complementary dynamic between the two branches in early
foreign relations has largely been forgotten. As a general matter,
scholars have understood foreign affairs under the Washington

1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond-Charles Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 301, 301 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995) [hereinafter
JEFFERSON PAPERS].
2. Letter from Edmund Randolph to John Laurance (Aug. 12, 1794), in 6 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 527, 527 (Maeva
Marcus ed., 1998) [hereinafter DHSC].
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administration to have been within the president’s purview. 3 The few
historical treatments of the Neutrality Crisis largely ignore the courts’
role, 4 while others treat the courtroom battles over French
privateering as a legal sideshow to the diplomatic main event. 5 Even
scholarly accounts that specifically attend to the legal and
constitutional dimensions of foreign affairs during the Washington
administration tend to focus their analysis on the executive branch.6
3. See, e.g., JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE NEW NATION
(1783–1793) 215 (1969) (“Washington did not hesitate to assert his primacy in diplomatic
affairs.”); GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
153 (1993) (“[W]ith regard to foreign and military affairs . . . Washington willingly accepted
[an] activist notion of presidential power.”); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 129 (1976) (summarizing Washington’s decision “to
assume control of government operations and policy-making over a range of activities”); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1999) (arguing that developments under the Washington
administration confirm the view that, under the Constitution, “the President possesses
significant independent constitutional authority over foreign affairs”).
4. See HARRY AMMON, THE GENET MISSION 100 (1973) (mentioning briefly the
Supreme Court’s refusal to give Washington an advisory opinion on privateering-related
questions); ALBERT HALL BOWMAN, THE STRUGGLE FOR NEUTRALITY: FRANCO-AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY DURING THE FEDERALIST ERA 75 (1974) (same); ALEXANDER DECONDE,
ENTANGLING ALLIANCE: POLITICS & DIPLOMACY UNDER GEORGE WASHINGTON 223 (1958)
(same); Martin S. Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling Over Presidential
Power Outside the Courts, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 21, 39 (Christopher H. Schroeder
& Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (“Resolution of the Neutrality Controversy took place in the
Executive Mansion rather than by the Supreme Court.”).
5. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 303–450 (1993)
(recounting the Neutrality Crisis with little mention of activity in the federal courts); CHARLES
MARION THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A STUDY IN CABINET GOVERNMENT
102–05, 117, 210 (1931) (mentioning briefly a handful of district court and Supreme
Court cases).
6. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF
FIGHTING SAIL 3 (2006) [hereinafter CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL] (contending that “the federal
courts played a relatively minor role” in resolving the Crisis); CHARLES G. FENWICK, THE
NEUTRALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 15–30 (1913) (focusing discussion of the Neutrality
Crisis on executive and legislative action); CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, THE FIRST AMERICAN
NEUTRALITY: A STUDY OF THE AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF NEUTRAL OBLIGATIONS
DURING THE YEARS 1792 TO 1815 (1934) (same); David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch,
A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of
International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 1023–35 (2010) (discussing the Washington
administration’s solicitation of an advisory opinion and its prosecution of Americans involved in
privateering but only briefly referencing the extensive civil litigation over privateering); Powell,
supra note 3, at 1485–95 (discussing the privateering episode without mentioning the courts);
Robert J. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington Administration,
46 U. RICH. L. REV. 373, 418–19 (2012) (devoting a single paragraph to Glass v. Sloop Betsy);
Charles Anthony Smith, Credible Commitments and the Early American Supreme Court, 42 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 75, 95–96 (2008) (same).
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Along the same lines, a longstanding preoccupation with presidential
behavior in scholarship exploring the founding generation’s
understanding of constitutional foreign affairs authority has obscured
the fact that the first executive delegated significant decisionmaking
responsibility to the judiciary. 7
To be sure, the story told here of the executive’s turn to the courts
has a familiar ring to it. President Washington’s unsuccessful attempt
in 1793 to secure an advisory opinion from the justices of the Supreme
Court on treaty relations with France presents a well-known—though
not well-understood—instance of the early executive seeking judicial
assistance in foreign affairs. 8 More broadly, recent scholarship on the
founding era has generally recognized the original constitutional
understanding that the new federal judiciary would—as John Marshall
put it to the Virginia ratifying convention in 1787—serve as “the
means of preventing disputes with foreign nations.” 9

7. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 626–87 (2004); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey,
The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 295–355 (2001); Powell, supra
note 3, at 1477–1511; Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1543 (2002); John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 290–95 (1996); see also Ann Woolhandler,
Treaties, Self-Execution, and the Public Law Litigation Model, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 757 (2002)
(asserting that the early federal courts were largely excluded from foreign relations).
8. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 78–80 (5th ed. 2003)
(discussing the justices’ refusal to answer the President’s questions); STEWART JAY, MOST
HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES 77–78 (1997) (same).
9. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 557 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 2nd ed. 1996)
(1891); see also Kevin Arlyck, Forged by War: The Federal Courts and Foreign Affairs in the Age
Of Revolution (Sept. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with
author); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of
Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445 (2011) [hereinafter Alien Tort Statute] (arguing that the First
Congress enacted the Alien Tort Statute as a means of ensuring that law of nations violations
committed by American citizens did not irreparably harm United States foreign relations); AnneMarie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J.
INT’L L. 461 (1989) (similar); Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 6, at 1000–07 (discussing how
the Constitution provided for federal court jurisdiction over cases that might implicate relations
with foreign nations); Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 830, 840 (2006) (asserting that the founding generation intended the federal
courts to play “a crucial role . . . in ensuring national security . . . and the peaceful conduct of
the Republic’s foreign affairs”); Smith, supra note 6, at 86–88 (citing founding-era statements
expressing sentiments similar to Marshall’s).
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The privateering cases at the heart of this Article, however, reveal
something new about the relationship between the two branches in
early foreign affairs. By insisting that disputes over captured British
property were to be resolved by the courts, the Washington
administration did not simply seek judicial support for its foreign
policy, as it did in the advisory opinion episode. Rather, it sought to
delegate decisionmaking responsibility on an important foreign affairs
matter to the courts entirely. And it was by no means obvious in
1793—let alone in 1787—that disputes like the one that erupted over
French privateering would end up in court. Foreign officials and even
members of Washington’s own cabinet expressed grave doubts about
whether the courts had the authority to decide questions raised by
French privateering. 10 The administration’s turn to the courts in the
Neutrality Crisis therefore cannot be understood as either cynically
self-interested or constitutionally mandated. It was instead a
pragmatic—and only partially successful—strategy by which the
executive branch sought to mobilize the institutional resources of a
coequal branch of government to address a problem it could not
manage alone.
Moreover, the judges themselves were skeptical. Recognizing that
neutral-court adjudication of disputes arising between belligerents was
contrary to the customary practice of European nations, in the Crisis’s
early stages district court judges steadfastly refused to take jurisdiction
over cases involving French privateer captures. 11 Even when the
Supreme Court reversed course and permitted British legal claims to
go forward, the justices struggled to decide cases in a way that helped
safeguard the United States’ neutrality while also maintaining fidelity
to the legal principles that governed relations among sovereign
nations. Furthermore, they displayed a marked unease over the
potential implications their assumption of jurisdiction had for the
United States’ international standing and the courts’ own institutional
well-being. In short, when the Washington administration tried to
push the privateering controversy into the courts, the courts
pushed back.
The judicial recalcitrance described here poses a challenge to
scholarship emphasizing the judiciary’s historically quiescent role in

10. See infra text accompanying notes 105–08.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 122–34.
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the Neutrality Crisis specifically 12 and in foreign affairs more
generally. 13 Though in many respects federal judges supported the
Washington administration’s effort to contain the French privateering
threat, in their decisions they made clear that executive-branch policy
priorities would need to be balanced against judicial ones. In other
words, rather than simply serving as the “handmaiden of the political
branches,” 14 federal judges sought to articulate their own vision of a
judicial role in managing foreign nations.
Reframing the Neutrality Crisis away from a narrative of executive
primacy and judicial acquiescence also highlights the limitations of
current debate. As Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison have recently
explained, arguments over separation of powers—particularly in the
realm of foreign affairs—are powerfully structured by understandings

12. See CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 165 (“Throughout the Neutrality
Crisis . . . federal judges played an active role in supporting the president’s policies.”); WILLIAM
R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN
JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 71 (1995) [hereinafter CASTO, SUPREME COURT] (“[T]he major
recurring theme of the [1790s] was the Justices’ on-going efforts to assist . . . in evolving a stable
relationship with the European powers.”); JAY, supra note 8, at 167–70 (suggesting that the
justices of the Supreme Court refused to give the president an advisory opinion in order to allow
Alexander Hamilton to control cabinet decisions on foreign policy); David Sloss, Judicial
Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 145, 148 (2008) [hereinafter Sloss,
Judicial Foreign Policy) (emphasizing the “consensus” that developed “among cabinet officers
and Supreme Court Justices that the federal judiciary should decide the issues raised by the
French privateering cases”); cf. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations
as Constitutional Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 729, 782–87 (2012) (describing two cases from the
Neutrality Crisis as instances where the Supreme Court applied the law of nations in order to
uphold specific Article I and II powers granted to Congress and the President); Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, The Founders’ Foreign Affairs Constitution: Improvising Among Empires, 53 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 209 (2008) (offering an illuminating gloss on Sloss’s account of judicial
involvement in the Neutrality Crisis but not questioning his notion of interbranch “consensus”).
13. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV.
649, 659 (2000) (“Since early in the nation’s history, courts have been reluctant to contradict
the executive branch in its conduct of foreign relations.”); John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The AntiBallistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851,
882–901 (2001) (arguing that the events surrounding Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation
support the principle of executive primacy in treaty interpretation); John O. McGinnis,
Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of
Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 307 (1993)
(“[T]he Court has largely ceded the rights of governance in foreign affairs and war powers to
the executive.”).
14. WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 103 (1964).

6

1

Foreign Affairs at the Founding

of historical practice. 15 But to a significant extent, discussion of the
proper judicial role in foreign affairs is preoccupied with questions of
deference—that is, the extent to which courts should cede foreign
affairs decisionmaking authority to the executive branch. While the
predominant view holds that broad judicial deference to the executive
is desirable, 16 a number of scholars advocate for a more prominent role
for courts. 17 Underlying the positions on both sides, however, is the
assumption that judicial decisionmaking in foreign affairs stands in
opposition to presidential policymaking.
The Neutrality Crisis tells us a different tale, one in which the
executive branch sought judicial intervention on an issue with
profound implications for United States foreign relations. In the
Washington administration’s view, judicial decisionmaking did not
undermine presidential policymaking—it complemented it. The story
related here reminds us, in other words, that deference is not the
only—or necessarily the best—way to think about the interaction
between the two branches in foreign affairs, and there may be contexts
in which judicial resolution of sensitive questions implicating foreign
affairs is fully consistent with executive branch prerogatives. At the
same time, however, judicial skepticism in the 1790s about the
wisdom of becoming enmeshed in disputes over French privateering
suggests that judges themselves might not always agree.
This Article proceeds as follows. Building on extensive research in
primary sources from the 1790s, the first three Parts explain how the
courts came to assume a preeminent role in the national response to
the Neutrality Crisis. Part I outlines the episode’s political
background. Part II uncovers the Washington administration’s
attempt to mobilize the federal judiciary to respond to the privateering
controversy and chronicles the courts’ initial rejection of that
approach. Part III details the Supreme Court’s struggle to reconcile
divergent legal and diplomatic imperatives. Part IV concludes by
considering how a full appreciation of the federal courts’ role in the
Neutrality Crisis can inform current thinking about executive-judicial
relationships in foreign affairs.

15. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 420 (2012) (“Invocations of historical practice are particularly
common in constitutional controversies implicating foreign relations.”).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 247–50.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 251–55.
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In February 1793 the National Convention of the French
Republic declared war against Great Britain, Spain, and the
Netherlands, transforming what had largely been a land war in
Western Europe into a global conflict fought across the seas. Given
British naval superiority in the Atlantic, France’s maritime strategy
sought to cripple enemy commerce through attacks by privateers—
privately-owned armed vessels operating with a license from the
French government to capture enemy vessels and cargo for their own
profit. 18 Access to American ports was crucial to French success;
political instability and slave rebellion in the Caribbean had disrupted
France’s control of its island possessions, leaving French maritime
forces with few safe harbors on the western side of the Atlantic. 19
Moreover, the French government understood Americans to have the
best privateers and the fittest ships. 20
Accordingly, when the government in Paris named EdmondCharles Genet as the new minister plenipotentiary to the United
States, his instructions included a directive to sponsor privateering

18. Throughout this Article I use the term “privateer” to refer to both the privatelyowned armed vessels—usually small, fast merchant ships armed with a few cannons—and the
men who manned them. Privateering was a central feature of maritime warfare in the early
modern era. Upon receipt of a commission from the government of a nation at war, a privateer
was authorized under the laws of war to capture ships belonging to citizens and subjects of
enemy nations. Once a seized vessel (and its cargo) was deemed to have been lawfully captured
by a tribunal of the government that had granted the commission, the captors were free to sell
the property and keep most of the proceeds. Commissioning privateers thereby enabled a nation
at war to mobilize military force against enemy commerce with little fiscal drain on the state. See
generally Arlyck, supra note 9, at 28–36; CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 43–44.
19. Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Consuls (May 1793), Archives Ministère des
Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance Politique, 37:384–85 [hereinafter AMAE-CP]; Letter
from Pierre-Auguste Adet to Timothy Pickering (May 18, 1796), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
FOREIGN RELATIONS 650–51 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington,
D.C., Gales & Seaton 1833) [hereinafter ASPFR]; MELVIN H. JACKSON, PRIVATEERS IN
CHARLESTON, 1793–1796: AN ACCOUNT OF A FRENCH PALATINATE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
1-2 (1969).
20. Remarks on the United States (Sep. 13, 1793), AMAE-CP, 38:215–17. American
privateering had a long pedigree, see CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1960) (describing privateering in the colonial era and during the
American Revolution), and privateering was enshrined in the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art
I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” i.e.,
privateering commissions).
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raids on British maritime commerce from bases in the United States. 21
Genet was given blank privateering commissions, to be delivered to
ship captains in the United States, authorizing them to prey on the
maritime commerce of the Republic’s enemies. 22
Within days of his arrival in Charleston, South Carolina in April
1793, Genet gave commissions to the owners and captains of several
private armed ships, and soon the privateers began capturing merchant
vessels at sea and sending them into Charleston to be sold. 23 Under
the law of prize, however, the captors could only sell the seized vessels
and cargo once a French tribunal had deemed the capture valid—a
determination that generally turned on whether the captors were
operating with a proper commission and whether the captured
property truly belonged to enemy citizens or subjects. 24 As there were
no regularly-constituted French admiralty courts operating in the
United States, Genet authorized French consular officials to conduct
condemnation and sale proceedings. 25
After launching privateers in Charleston, Genet headed north to
officially present himself to President Washington in Philadelphia.
Along the way he was cheered by enthusiastic crowds and entertained
by the cream of southern society “in the midst of perpetual fetes.”26

21. Supplement Aux Instructions Donnés Au Citoyen Genet (Dec. 1792), in
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE FRENCH MINISTERS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1791–1797, at 207,
207–09 (Frederick J. Turner ed., 1904) [hereinafter CFM]. Genet was also instructed to
incubate “revolutionary principles” among settlers on the Spanish frontier along the Mississippi
and intrigue among Native Americans in the northwest. See Relatif Aux Instructions de Genet
(Dec. 1792), in CFM, supra, at 201, 201–02; Mémoire pour servir d’instruction au Citoyen
Genet (Dec. 1792), in CFM, supra, at 202, 205; see generally AMMON, supra note 4, at 21–29.
22. Relatif Aux Instructions de Genet, supra note 21.
23. See Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs (April 16,
1793), in CFM, supra note 21, at 211–13 (describing his activities); Letter from EdmondCharles Genet to Consuls (May 29, 1793), AMAE-CP 37:469–70 (instructing consuls in other
ports to distribute additional privateering commissions); see generally JACKSON, supra note 19.
24. CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 37–40.
25. See Letter from Michel-Ange-Bernard Mangourit to Citoyen Monge (May 29, 1793),
Archives Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance Consulaire et Commerciale
[hereinafter AMAE-CCC], Charleston, 2:29–30 (describing a streamlined adjudicatory process
meant to encourage privateers by giving them quick access to the proceeds from prize sales).
26. Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Citoyen LeBrun (May 31, 1793), in CFM,
supra note 21, at 216; see also Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (May 9, 1793),
in 25 JEFFERSON PAPERS supra note 1, at 697 (reporting that in Virginia one “scarcely f[ou]nd
a man unfriendly to the French revolution”); AMMON, supra note 4, at 51–55 (detailing Genet’s
reception by the American public).
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Things were the same in Philadelphia, 27 which came as no surprise to
Jefferson, who claimed that “99 in a hundred” of Americans were—
like he—supporters of the French Revolution. 28 Jefferson’s enthusiasm
was tempered, however, by a keen awareness of the dangers that
popular fervor posed for the United States. In describing the
Philadelphia scene to James Monroe, he added a cautionary note: “I
wish we may be able to repress the spirit of the people within the limits
of a fair neutrality.” 29
B.

Proclaiming Neutrality

Neutrality—fair or otherwise—would prove difficult to ensure.
Alarmed by reports of the privateering activity in Charleston,
Washington’s cabinet convened in Philadelphia in mid-April to
consider its course of action. Though personal opinions of the French
Revolution within the cabinet ranged from hostile to enthusiastic, all
agreed that going to war against Britain as a French ally would be
foolish. 30 The new nation’s military capabilities were negligible, and it
was territorially surrounded by British, Spanish, and potentially hostile
Indian forces. More importantly, the national economy was largely
dependent on maritime commerce, both in exporting Americangrown food to European colonies in the Caribbean and in carrying
colonial products to markets in Europe. Formal entry into the war
would render American ships fair game for the British warships that
prowled sea lanes in the Caribbean. Conversely, by remaining neutral
as the belligerents decimated each other’s commerce, the United
States could ensure that its merchants profited from the increased
demand for American products and shipping services. 31

27. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (May 5, 1793), in 25 JEFFERSON
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 660–62 (describing Genet’s reception in Philadelphia); CASTO,
FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 41–43 (similar).
28. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Jan. 3, 1793), in 25 JEFFERSON
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 14; see also Letter from Alexander Hamilton to William Short (Feb. 5,
1793) in 14 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 7 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969) [hereinafter
HAMILTON PAPERS] (“The popular tide in this country is strong in favor of the last revolution
in France.”); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 5, at 308–17 (discussing enthusiasm for the
French Revolution).
29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, supra note 27, at 661.
30. See CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 21–25 (discussing cabinet views).
31. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 7, 1793), in 25
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 333 (opining that adherence to strict neutrality “will give
to our Navigation an Encrease too rapid almost for Conjecture”); Opinion on Ship Passports
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Fortunately, the French government had no intention of asking
the United States to directly join the fight. 32 Recognizing that
American military weakness made the new nation a liability rather than
an asset in war, the French government instead wanted the United
States to pay off its remaining Revolutionary War debt to France,
provide food for its armies in Europe, and facilitate French military
activity in the Americas. 33
Thus the central question the Washington administration faced in
1793 was not whether to remain neutral but rather what exactly
“neutrality” entailed and how to go about securing it. One difficulty
was that the particular rights and obligations of neutral nations under
the law of nations were by no means clear. 34 In particular, opinions
diverged regarding the sorts of assistance a neutral could provide to a
belligerent. 35 Complicating matters, there were questions regarding
the extent to which preexisting treaty commitments to one belligerent
affected a neutral’s general obligation of equal treatment. 36
In spite of the profound legal complexities the war provoked, the
cabinet agreed that the government needed to take steps to prevent
American participation in French privateering from “embroiling” the
nation in the conflict. 37 Accordingly, President Washington issued a

(May 3, 1793), in 25 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 646 (“The great harvest for [profits]
is when other nations are at war, and our flag neutral.”); Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law
as Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 1, 43–47 (1999) (discussing the importance of neutrality for American commerce).
32. See AMMON, supra note 4, at 21–22.
33. DECONDE, supra note 4, at 204–06; CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 16–17.
34. See Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Treaties with France (Apr. 28, 1793), in 25
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 608, 613 (“Where [law of nations publicists] agree their
authority is strong: but where they differ, and they often differ, we must appeal to our own
feelings and reason to decide between them.”).
35. See HYNEMAN, supra note 6, at 36–41; Jules Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the
Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 10–13 (1983); Reinstein, supra note 6, at 384–400.
36. See HYNEMAN, supra note 6, at 23–24; Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 155,
(1795) (Paterson, J.) (“An exact impartiality must mark [a neutral nation’s] conduct towards
the parties at war . . . . To this rule there is no exception, but what arises from the obligation of
antecedent treaties, which ought to be religiously observed.”).
37. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 12, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 541; see also Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Thomas
Jefferson, supra note 31, at 333 (warning that Genet’s commissioning of privateers “might
expose us to Suspicion and finally involve us in War”); Reinstein, supra note 6, at 391 (“Had
the administration supported Genet’s plan for using United States ports as bases for preying on
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short statement on April 22, now known as the Neutrality
Proclamation. Declaring that “the duty and interest” of the United
States required the government to “pursue a conduct friendly and
impartial toward the belligerent Powers,” Washington warned that
American citizens who engaged in or abetted hostile acts against a
belligerent, in violation of the law of nations, would receive no
protection from the government.38 In addition, he called for the
criminal prosecution of any such transgressions that came “within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States.” 39
The administration’s resolve to remain neutral was immediately
put to the test. Early on, Minister Genet returned a British vessel that
had been seized within United States waters 40 and instructed consuls
that privateering commissions were to be given only to French-owned
and French-manned vessels. 41 But he made clear that French consuls
stationed in the United States were generally to dispose of French
prizes “without the intervention of the American Government.” 42 And
with good reason: Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty of Amity between
France and the United States stipulated that the privateers of either
party could “freely . . . carry whithersoever they please, the ships and
goods taken from their enemies” without being “arrested or seized”
in the ports of the other, and that the “officers” of both parties were
forbidden from “mak[ing] examination concerning the lawfulness of
such prizes.” 43 From the French perspective, these provisions gave
them explicit permission to use the United States as a base
for privateering. 44
The Washington administration soon discovered that reconciling
France’s favored status with a policy of strict neutrality would be

British ships, the result could have been a calamitous war with Great Britain.”); ELKINS &
MCKITRICK, supra note 5, at 334.
38. Proclamation of American Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 19,
at 140.
39. Id.
40. Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (May 27, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 124–27.
41. Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Consuls (May 29, 1793), AMAE-CP, 37:469.
42. Id.
43. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Fr.-U.S., art. XVII, Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 12, 22
[hereinafter Treaty of Amity].
44. See Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 14, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 281 (protesting the arrest of a French privateer armed in
New York as a violation of Franco-American treaties).
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difficult. 45 George Hammond, the British minister plenipotentiary to
the United States, sent Jefferson a barrage of complaints about French
privateering, 46 warning that its persistence could “lead to the most
dangerous consequences.” 47 Though Hammond did not elaborate, his
meaning was clear enough: The British government would consider
the arming of privateers in the United States and the condemnation
and sale of prizes as hostile acts on the part of the United States—
conduct that might demand reprisals from Britain.
Faced with this alarming prospect, Jefferson asked French officials
to stop the consular condemnations taking place in Charleston and
announced that French privateers were prohibited from fitting out in
the United States. 48 But as reports of privateering activity continued
to roll in, 49 the administration recognized that general threats would
not dissuade adventurous Americans from joining the privateers, nor
would ad hoc responses to individual incidents satisfy general British
complaints. More decisive action would be required.
II.

RECRUITING THE JUDICIARY

Confronted with an intractable foreign affairs problem it could
not manage on its own, the Washington administration turned to the
courts. Initially the administration’s judicial recruitment effort took
three forms: instituting criminal prosecutions against Americans who
joined the French privateering effort, seeking an advisory opinion

45. Alexander Hamilton’s preferred solution was to declare the treaties with France void
or suspended, on the theory that the United States was authorized under the law of nations to
avoid its prior obligations until the French political situation was resolved. Letter from Alexander
Hamilton & Henry Knox to George Washington (May 2, 1793), in 14 HAMILTON PAPERS,
supra note 28, at 367. Jefferson convinced Washington to eschew this radical (and transparently
pro-British) approach. CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 32–33.
46. See, e.g., Memorial from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (May 8, 1793), in
25 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 684; Memorial from George Hammond to Thomas
Jefferson (May 8, 1793), in 25 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 685, 685–86; Memorial
from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (May 8, 1793), in 25 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 686, 686–87.
47. Memorial from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (May 8, 1793), in 25
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 685, 685–86.
48. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jean-Baptiste Ternant (May 15, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 42, 42–43; Thomas Jefferson, Cabinet Memorandum on
French Privateers (June 1, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 155; Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Edmond-Charles Genet (June 5, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 195–96.
49. See, e.g., Letter from William Vans Murray to Thomas Jefferson (May 9, 1793), in 25
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 698, 698–99.
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from the Supreme Court regarding a number of privateering-related
questions, and instructing the owners of captured British ships to file
suit for their recovery under the federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction.
Though each step was taken in response to particular circumstances,
the administration’s approach to management of the privateering
controversy reflected a central understanding that judicial intervention
in the Crisis could help secure United States neutrality and keep the
nation out of the conflict.
There are important differences, however, in these three strategies.
In instituting criminal prosecutions and requesting an advisory
opinion, the administration primarily sought judicial approval and
support for policies the cabinet had already settled upon. Such moves
reflected the administration’s desire to marshal the courts’
institutional authority in support of its policy of strict neutrality.
In contrast, by seeking to have disputes over the disposition of
property captured by French privateers adjudicated by federal judges
rather than be addressed through diplomatic negotiation, the
administration sought to delegate to the courts decisionmaking
authority on questions of sovereign right with deep implications for
United States foreign relations. In fact, by insisting to foreign
representatives that independent judicial resolution of such disputes—
free from executive interference—was the only appropriate means of
addressing the privateering problem, the administration deliberately
sacrificed its own authority over foreign affairs in the interest of
defusing a diplomatic controversy of dangerous scope.
The administration’s initial attempt to enlist the judiciary largely
failed. Though federal judges agreed that American participation in
French privateering was punishable as a matter of law, securing
criminal convictions from local juries proved impossible. 50 More
problematically, the justices of the Supreme Court refused the
administration’s request for an advisory opinion, 51 and district court
judges rejected the notion that private suits under the courts’
admiralty jurisdiction were a proper means by which the owners of
vessels and cargo seized by French privateers could secure their
restitution. 52 Though administration officials still held out hope that
the courts would eventually intervene, by late 1793 judicial reluctance
to become involved left the executive adrift.

50. See infra text accompanying notes 73–79.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 93–94.
52. See, e.g., Findlay v. William, 9. F. Cas. 57, 61 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 4790).
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A.

Criminal Prosecution

Within days of the Neutrality Proclamation, the Washington
administration moved to marshal judicial support for its neutrality
policy. On Jefferson’s orders, 53 the federal district attorney at
Philadelphia instituted a criminal prosecution against Gideon
Henfield, an American seaman involved in the capture of a British
vessel by a French privateer off the capes of Delaware. 54 From
Jefferson’s perspective, the prosecution would serve two purposes:
First, it would “satisfy the complaint of the British Min[ister]”
regarding American participation in the French war effort while
sparing the administration from the full diplomatic consequences of
such action. 55 For example, when Genet demanded that the
administration secure Henfield’s release, 56 Jefferson demurred on the
ground that the executive branch had no authority over the court that
had authorized Henfield’s arrest. 57 But he assured Genet that the trial
would be overseen by “Judges of learning and integrity” and that if
Henfield had violated no law he would be duly acquitted. 58
In Jefferson’s view, prosecution of an American participant in
French privateering would also “try the question” of whether such
conduct was punishable by law. 59 There were grounds for doubt. As
Minister Genet astutely pointed out, there existed no positive law or
treaty forbidding Americans from participating in French
privateering. 60 Though criminal prosecutions for violations of federal
common law were not as controversial in 1793 as they would soon

53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Rawle (May 15, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 40, 40–41.
54. DUNLAP’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER (Phila.), May 15, 1793, at 3; Memorial from
Edmond-Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (May 27, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 130; see generally CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 46–48, 85–86, 91.
55. CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 246.
56. Memorial from Edmond-Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 54; see also
William R. Casto, Foreign Affairs Crises and the Constitution’s Case or Controversy Limitation:
Notes from the Founding Era, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237 (2004).
57. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond-Charles Genet (June 1, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 160.
58. Id.
59. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Neutrality Questions (July 13, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 498, 498–99.
60. Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 1, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 159.
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become, 61 the Washington administration knew that its prosecutorial
theory—that Henfield could be criminally punished for violating the
general laws of neutrality—was vulnerable. 62 A successful prosecution
would resolve that problem.
More importantly, “try[ing] the question” in federal court would
enable the administration to mobilize judicial “learning and integrity”
in the service of executive-branch policy goals. The federal circuit
courts—composed of the local district court judge and a traveling
justice of the Supreme Court 63—had original jurisdiction over most
federal crimes. 64 At the opening of each sitting of the circuit court, the
senior judge gave a general charge to the grand jury in which he
outlined the applicable statutory and common law. 65 In many cases he
also instructed his co-citizens more generally on the rights and
obligations they enjoyed under their new government—including the
necessity of respecting treaties and the law of nations. 66 Their charges

61. On the early history of the federal common law of crimes, see generally CASTO,
SUPREME COURT, supra note 12, at 129–41; Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard
Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 26
(1978); Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common
Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223 (1986); Gary D. Rowe, The Sound
of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition
of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919 (1992).
62. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (July 14, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 502 (noting that the federal district attorney had doubts about whether
Henfield had committed a punishable offense); see also CASTO, SUPREME COURT, supra note
12, at 131 (noting Justice Iredell’s “considerable doubts” about whether a defendant could be
punished for a nonstatutory crime).
63. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the circuit courts were originally composed of two
justices and a district court judge, but in response to the justices’ complaints about the onerous
burden of circuit riding Congress reduced the requirement in March 1793. Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75; Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333–34;
see generally Wythe Holt, “The Federal Courts Have Enemies in All Who Fear Their Influence on
State Objects”: The Failure to Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Riding in the Judiciary Acts of 1792
and 1793, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 301 (1987) (describing 1790s changes in circuit riding).
64. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11.
65. See Maeva Marcus, The Effect (or Non-Effect) of Founders on the Supreme Court Bench,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1794, 1799 (2012) (“Each session [of the circuit court] would begin
with the presiding judge giving a charge to the grand jury.”).
66. See, e.g., John Jay’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of
New York (Apr. 20, 1790), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 25, 29 (“You will recollect that the
Laws of Nations make Part of the Laws of this, and of every other civilized Nation.”); see
generally Marcus, supra note 65, at 1799–1800 (discussing the prominence of the law of nations
in grand jury charges).
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were regularly reprinted in the newspapers for edification of the
general public. 67
Because the obligations of neutrality were unfamiliar to most
Americans, Jefferson hoped that erudite charges from federal judges
would serve to warn the broader public against “acts which may
endanger our peace.” 68 The intended audience was not simply a
domestic one, either; Jefferson sent copies of the Henfield grand jury
charge to European capitals to “explain[] abroad the position of the
United States,” 69 transforming the charge from a set of instructions to
the jury in a specific criminal case into a policy statement regarding
the United States’ understanding of its obligations as a neutral nation.
The administration’s efforts to promote its policy objectives
through the courts would only succeed, of course, with cooperation
from the justices themselves. The cabinet, however, had good reason
to believe that support would be forthcoming. The federal bench was
stocked with Federalists, 70 and Chief Justice Jay was a close friend of
Washington and Hamilton and a strong proponent of strict
neutrality. 71 The administration’s confidence was vindicated when

67. See generally Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP.
CT. REV. 127; Maeva Marcus & Emily Field Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New Federal
System, 1789–1800, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 31
(Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988). Volumes two and three of the DHSC contain numerous
examples of the justices’ grand jury charges during this period.
68. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (May 8, 1793), in 25 JEFFERSON
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 691, 691–92; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George
Hammond (June 13, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 270, 270–71 (assuring
the British minister that prosecution in a few cases would rapidly acquaint the citizenry with its
duties and “lessen the occasions of recurrence to the public authority” in the future).
69. FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 49 n.* (1849); see also Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1693), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at
697, 697–702; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 26, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 760.
70. See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 150 (2001) (“[T]he federal judiciary under Washington and Adams [was] exclusively
Federalist.”); see also CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 27–28.
71. Jay had in fact prepared a first draft of the Neutrality Proclamation at Hamilton’s
request, CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 27–28, and in the early days of the crisis he
had instructed a Virginia grand jury that participation in the conflict was criminally punishable
as a violation of United States’ treaties as well as the law of nations. John Jay’s Charge to the
Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia (May 22, 1793), in 2 DHSC, supra
note 2, at 381, 381–85; see also Sandra Frances VanBurkleo, “Honour, Justice, and Interest”: John
Jay’s Republican Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench, 4 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 239, 264–
65 (1984) (noting Jay’s support for Hamilton during the Crisis).
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Justice James Wilson charged the grand jury specially convened to
consider Henfield’s case. Noting that nations were generally
accountable for the conduct of their citizens, Wilson fully endorsed
the administration’s view that participation in French privateering was
criminally punishable in federal court. 72
Even working together, however, judges and executive branch
officials were unable to convince jurors that the obligations of
neutrality warranted punishment for Americans who joined the
French privateering campaign. 73 Though the reasons are not entirely
clear, the jury in Henfield’s case found him not guilty.74
Administration officials tried to spin the acquittal as one based on
sympathy, not law, 75 but French officials viewed it as affirmation of
their view that Americans could freely join the French war effort, 76 and
the public appeared to agree. Soon thereafter, several defendants
indicted for serving on a French privateer were acquitted in Georgia,
“contrary to the opinion of the judges.” 77 Numerous other
prosecutions appear to have gone nowhere. 78 The difficulty, Justice

72. James Wilson’s Charge to the Grand Jury of a Special Session of the Circuit Court for
the District of Pennsylvania (July 22, 1793), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 414.
73. See id. at 420–21 (framing Henfield’s conduct as not simply an individual criminal act
but one that posed an existential threat to the nation itself).
74. The jury was apparently swayed by Henfield’s argument that he had renounced
United States citizenship by enlisting on the French privateer, and was therefore not bound by
the laws of neutrality, though one juror complained that he had been induced to vote for
acquittal by public threats from French partisans against anyone who voted to convict. CASTO,
FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 97; see also JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 389–90 (Robert Faulkner & Paul Carrese eds., Liberty Fund, Inc., spec. ed. for
schools 2000) (1838) (concluding that the jury rejected what they perceived to be the
Washington administration’s attempt to impose legal obligations by executive fiat).
75. See CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 99–100 (noting that Attorney General
Randolph published an anonymous newspaper item attributing Henfield’s acquittal to either a
deficiency of proof or “equitable circumstances”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur
Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 697, 697–702
(characterizing the verdict as a pardon, not an acquittal, granted because the jury was convinced
that Henfield had not actually intended to violate the law or compromise United
States neutrality).
76. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 173–74 (noting that after Henfield’s acquittal, French
officials published newspaper advertisements inviting all “Friends of Liberty” to enlist in the
republican cause).
77. CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 100.
78. See United States v. Sheftall (Cir. Ct. Ga. April 16, 1794), National Archives and
Records Administration [hereinafter NARA], Circuit Court for Georgia, Case Files; CASTO,
FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 101–02; HYNEMAN, supra note 6, at 83–84; CHARLES
WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 114–15 (1922); Letter from
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James Iredell later explained, was that it was “scarcely possible to
explain to a Jury’s satisfaction the obligations arising from Common
Law” 79—a tacit acknowledgement that judicial support for executivebranch policy might be insufficient to resolve the deep problems
created by the French privateering effort.
B.

Advice from the Court

Judicial cooperation also proved maddeningly elusive. Even before
Henfield’s acquittal, Washington’s cabinet had resolved to seek the
courts’ support for its neutrality policy by other means as well. With
British officials insisting that the federal government had an obligation
to interdict privateers 80 and their French rivals defying government
requests that they curtail their activities, 81 the administration went to
the Supreme Court for help. 82 The cabinet drafted a list of twentynine questions respecting the activities of French privateers and asked
the justices whether they would be amenable to answering them. 83 In
communicating the President’s request, Jefferson indicated that the
administration needed help in reconciling its policy of strict neutrality

Christopher Gore to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 10, 1793), in 27 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note
1, at 79, 79–80; CONN. J., Sept. 4, 1793, at 3; DAILY ADVERTISTER (Bos.), Oct. 26, 1793, at 2.
79. Letter from James Iredell to Edmund Randolph (May 2, 1794), in 2 DHSC, supra
note 2 at 451, 451–52.
80. E.g., Letter from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (July 10, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 461; Letter from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson
(June 19, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 322, 322–23.
81. See, e.g., Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson, (July 9, 1793), in
26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 456, 456–57. Matters came to a head when French
officials—no doubt emboldened by recent court victories—allowed a privateer allegedly fitted
out in Philadelphia to leave port, despite the administration’s demand that it be detained. See
CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 103–06; JAY, supra note 8, at 132–34; Editorial Note,
The Referral of Neutrality Questions to the Supreme Court, in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note
1, at 524–26.
82. See Editorial Note, The Referral of Neutrality Questions to the Supreme Court, in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 524, 524–25; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George
Hammond & Edmond-Charles Genet (July 12, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1,
at 487 (noting that the President had “determined to refer the questions [respecting neutrality]
to persons learned in the laws”).
83. Thomas Jefferson, Questions for the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 534, 534–36; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Justices
of the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 520. It is
unclear whether the actual list of questions was ever sent to the justices. JAY, supra note 8,
at 136–38.

19

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2017

with the nation’s obligations under treaty and the law of nations.84
The war between France and Britain gave rise to questions “of great[]
importance,” he explained, but they often arose “under circumstances
which do not give a cognisance of them to the tribunals of the
country.” 85 By providing guidance, Jefferson asserted, the justices
would help secure the government “against errors dangerous to the
peace of the [United States].” 86
Examined in isolation, the administration’s request for an advisory
opinion has generally been understood as motivated by the cabinet’s
uncertainty over the United States’ international rights and
obligations and its belief that the justices’ expertise in such areas
rendered them specially fit for resolving any doubts. 87 While there is
no doubt some truth to such explanations, 88 when considered in light
of the administration’s turn to the courts more generally, it becomes
evident that the administration’s request for an advisory opinion was
not primarily motivated by a desire to get the best legal advice
available. Cabinet members were actually in agreement on the most
important questions, 89 and Jefferson’s stated intention of publicizing
the justices’ responses 90—as he had done with Justice Wilson’s grand
jury charge in Henfield—indicates that diplomatic considerations

84. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Justices of the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793),
in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 520.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 108–10 (asserting that Washington
sought an advisory opinion in part to resolve internal cabinet disagreement on privateeringrelated questions); Reinstein, supra note 6, at 418–19 (arguing that President Washington
sought the justices’ opinion primarily because he understood the law of nations as binding on
the executive).
88. See Letter from William Bradford, Jr. to Elias Boudinot (July 14, 1793), in 6 DHSC,
supra note 2, at 744 (suggesting that the request was motivated by “some difference in
construction of the treaty [with France] . . . among the President’s advisors”); Thomas Jefferson,
Alexander Hamilton & Henry Knox, Cabinet Opinion on Consulting the Supreme Court (July
12, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 484 (noting that the cabinet had resolved
to refer the questions “to persons learned in the laws”).
89. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Neutrality Questions (July 13, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 498, 498–99 (noting cabinet unanimity as to whether the
Treaty of Amity allowed the United States to prohibit the arming of French privateers in port,
whether such action was required by the law of nations, and whether U.S. citizens could be
criminally punished for participating in hostilities).
90. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Justices of the Supreme Court (July 18,
1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 520 (asking “[w]hether the public may, with
propriety, be availed of [the justices’] advice on these questions”).
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loomed large in the administration’s request. From the executive’s
perspective, because the Court’s expertise and authority “ensure[d]
the respect of all parties” to the controversy, 91 an opinion from the
justices endorsing the administration’s strict neutrality policy would
be a great help in countering foreign claims of legal right, particularly
those advanced by France. 92
The justices, however, famously declined to answer. To
“extrajudicially” answer legal questions outside the bounds of an
actual case, they said, would blur the “Lines of Separation drawn by
the Constitution between the three Departments of Government”
and undermine the Supreme Court’s position as the tribunal of last
resort in the federal scheme. 93 Though the justices regretted any
“Embarrassment” that their refusal might cause the government, they
expressed confidence in the President’s independent ability to
“discern what is Right,” and to “surmount every obstacle to the
Preservation of the Rights, Peace, and Dignity of the United States.” 94
The significance of the justices’ refusal to give an advisory opinion
has been much discussed by historians of the early federal judiciary. 95
The traditional story—that the justices were adhering to a self-evident
prohibition against advisory opinions located in the Constitution’s
“Case or Controversy” requirement 96—has been called into question
by more recent scholarship, which notes that such opinions were quite
common in the English tradition and in the justices’ own practice. 97
Accordingly, scholars who understand the judiciary as largely having
played a supporting role in the Neutrality Crisis have been hardpressed to explain why an otherwise-complaisant Court would refuse
91. Id.
92. See CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 109 (“In seeking advice from the Court,
President Washington undoubtedly was motivated in part by a desire to obtain political support
for his decisions.”).
93. Letter from Supreme Court Justices to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 13
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 392 (Theodore J. Crackel et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter
WASHINGTON PAPERS].
94. Id.
95. See JAY, supra note 8, at 1–9 (reviewing the literature).
96. See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 626 n.68 (1971) (“[The justices’ refusal]
was grounded on . . . the impropriety of extrajudicial decision of the questions proffered.”);
THOMAS, supra note 5, at 150 (“The justices explained the refusal solely on constitutional
grounds. There is no reason for attributing any other motive to them.”).
97. See JAY, supra note 8, at 10–112 (discussing the English and American tradition of
advisory opinions).
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Washington’s request for advice. Some have argued that the justices
sought to strike a blow for judicial independence by establishing the
principle that the president could not demand an opinion from the
Court, as the Constitution allowed with respect to the heads of the
executive departments. 98 Others have suggested, somewhat
paradoxically, that the justices’ refusal was in fact meant to strengthen
the administration’s hand. 99
When viewed in the context of the Neutrality Crisis more
generally, however, the justices’ refusal can be understood to reflect
some of the same concerns raised by their district court brethren
regarding the wisdom of judicial involvement in matters implicating
foreign relations. 100 To be sure, individual justices had shown no
hesitation in jumping into the privateering fray in criminal cases. 101 But
in that context they only had to decide whether the federal
government had the legal authority to criminally punish Americans
who participated in French privateering, an issue that only tangentially
impacted the sovereign rights of foreign nations. The request for an
advisory opinion, in contrast, posed numerous questions directly
addressing the French government’s authority to use the United
States as a base for prosecuting its war against British maritime
commerce. 102 Providing definitive answers to the administration’s
questions would force the justices to take sides on matters of
significant international import. 103

98. See Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 67, at 33–34; Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial
Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 144–58; see also U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2 (stating that the president “may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer
in each of the executive Departments”). This view has some evidentiary support. See Letter from
Supreme Court Justices to George Washington, supra note 93, at 392 (noting that “the Power
given by the Constitution to the President of calling on the Heads of Departments for opinions,
seems to have been purposely as well as expressly limited to executive Departments”).
99. In his insightful study of the advisory opinion episode, Stewart Jay suggests that
Alexander Hamilton’s allies on the Court—Chief Justice Jay in particular—declined the
president’s request for advice so as to give the domineering Treasury Secretary a freer hand in
shaping administration policy. JAY, supra note 8, at 167–70. As ingenious as this theory is, it is
bereft of evidentiary support.
100. See discussion infra Section II.C.
101. See discussion supra Section II.A.
102. See Thomas Jefferson, Questions for the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 534–36.
103. Cf. JAY, supra note 8, at 161–67 (suggesting that the refusal to give an advisory
opinion was prompted by the justices’ desire to avoid entanglement in the domestic political
debate over the French Revolution).
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Viewed in this light, the justices’ stated desire to maintain the
“Lines of Separation” between the departments of government was
not just a hedge against judicial aggrandizement, nor was it simply a
declaration of autonomy. It was an attempt to define the fraught
territory of foreign relations as an area of executive, not judicial,
responsibility. As we shall see, this initial line in the sand would, under
the pressure of political necessity, later become blurred. 104 But in the
early days of the Neutrality Crisis, judicial reluctance to become
enmeshed in the privateering controversy confounded executive
attempts to share responsibility for keeping the nation out of war.
C.

Private Lawsuits

The Washington administration fared no better in turning to the
district courts. One of the key points of contention in the Neutrality
Crisis involved the disposition of ships and cargo captured by French
privateers operating from the United States. 105 British officials made it
abundantly clear that they would hold the federal government
responsible for losses stemming from such captures. 106 Taking up this
theme, Hamilton warned the cabinet that failure to provide recourse
would give Great Britain grounds for retaliation against American
commerce. 107 But as Jefferson pointed out, a French privateer sailing
with a valid commission had a right to seize enemy ships and an
infringement of United States neutrality did not necessarily give the
federal government grounds to restore an otherwise lawfully-seized

104. See discussion infra Part III.
105. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 40 (reserving the question of prize restoration for additional
deliberation by the cabinet); Reinstein, supra note 6, at 441 (“The sales of French captured
prizes was one of the more difficult issues for the administration.”).
106. See, e.g., Letter from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 30, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 789, 789–90 (reiterating his understanding that the
government will restore prizes seized by privateers fitted out in the United States to their owners,
or pay compensation); Letter from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (May 8, 1793), in
25 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 687 (expressing his confidence that “the executive
government of the United States will pursue such measures as to its wisdom may appear the best
calculated for . . . restoring to their rightful owners” captures made by French privateers).
107. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (May 15, 1793), in 14
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 28, at 460.
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prize to its owners. In fact, doing so could well be considered an act
of war against France, raising the specter of reprisal from that side. 108
With good reason to fear that executive action (or inaction) could
lead to hostilities with one belligerent or the other, the executive
branch again turned to the courts. Seeking to deflect demands for
direct executive intervention, administration officials instructed
British officials to seek recovery of captured property via suit under
the federal district courts’ admiralty jurisdiction. 109 Though Jefferson
assured the British minister that state militias would be available to
help enforce judgments rendered by “the civil power,” he made clear
that the administration understood these disputes fundamentally to
involve “questions of private property,” for which answers were
“provided for by the laws.” 110 Accordingly, the owners of the captured
vessels were “to take measures as in ordinary civil cases for the support
of their rights judicially.” 111
In classifying privateering-related disputes as “ordinary civil cases”
amenable to standard legal process, the Washington administration
pushed the boundaries of the judicial role in foreign affairs. Of course,
the federal judiciary had been created in significant part to obviate
difficulties in foreign relations by providing foreign litigants—
especially British creditors—an impartial forum in which to pursue
their legal claims, something they were often denied in the state
courts. 112 In particular, the constitutional and statutory grant of
federal jurisdiction over “admiralty and maritime” cases was meant to
ensure that international commerce—the lifeblood of the new
nation—flowed free of the entanglements of local parochialism. 113 And
international litigation over the prizes of war had been an established

108. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Restoration of Prizes (May 16, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 50, 50–52; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George
Hammond (June 5, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 197, 197–98 (contending
that if French privateers were operating with a valid commission “it would be an aggression on
th[at] nation” for the government to restore the prizes they seized to their original owners).
109. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (June 13, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 270, 270–71.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 6, at 1004; Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”:
Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1421, 1452–57.
113. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 6, at 1004; Smith, supra note 6, at 88.
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feature of inter-imperial relations for centuries. 114 Accordingly, in
promoting the resolution of a sensitive diplomatic matter through the
judicial application of legal rules to fact-specific cases, the Washington
administration adopted an approach that broadly accorded with
domestic constitutional principles as well as longstanding practices of
European empires.
At the same time, however, the administration’s approach
represented an important innovation in—or violation of—
international legal norms. One of the fundamental rules of the law
governing maritime prizes was that the validity of such captures be
adjudicated by a tribunal of the nation under whose authority the
seizure had been made. 115 As Hamilton himself acknowledged, there
was no warrant under the laws of war for the courts of a neutral nation
to make such determinations. 116 From his perspective, redress for
French violations of United States neutrality was “an affair
between . . . Governments” properly settled “by reasons of state, not
rules of law.” 117 French officials made the same argument: In
customary international practice, neutrality violations were to be
addressed through the intervention of “public ministers,” not the
process of “incompetent” courts. 118
114. See generally HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1775–1787 (1977); RICHARD
PARES, COLONIAL BLOCKADE AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS 1739–1763 (1938); Lauren Benton,
Legalities of the Sea in Gentili’s Hispanica Advocatio, in THE ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS: ALBERICO GENTILI AND THE JUSTICE OF EMPIRE 269 (Benedict Kingsbury
& Benjamin Straumann eds., 2011); Arlyck, supra note 9, at 28–43.
115. See L’Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 253–57 (1816) (discussing the rule that
jurisdiction over a prize lies in the courts of the capturing nation); HENRY WHEATON, A DIGEST
OF THE LAWS OF MARITIME CAPTURES AND PRIZES 258 (New York, R. M’Dermut & D.D.
Arden 1815) (“The validity of maritime captures is . . . determined in courts of prize established
in the country of the captor.”).
116. Memorandum from Alexander Hamilton (May 15, 1793), in 12 WASHINGTON
PAPERS, supra note 93, at 577, 577–82 (arguing that courts in the United States were “not
competent” to rule on the restitution of privateer captures); see also Findlay v. William, 9 F. Cas.
57, 59–61 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 4790) (concluding that, under international practice, the courts
of neutral nations could not take jurisdiction over prizes captured by belligerents).
117. Memorandum from Alexander Hamilton (May 15, 1793), in 12 WASHINGTON
PAPERS, supra note 93, at 582. Recognizing that the failure to provide any recourse to the victims
of privateer seizures would be dangerous, Hamilton eventually agreed that it would be advisable
to “make the experiment of a reference to the Civil Tribunal.” Letter from Alexander Hamilton
to Rufus King (June 15, 1793), in 14 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 28, at 547.
118. Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 14, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 281; see also Protest of Citizen Hauterive, Consul of the
republic of France, at New York, against the process and seizure of the Catherine of Halifax

25

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2017

In response, Jefferson sought to justify judicial intervention on
both practical and constitutional grounds. Judges, he asserted, were
better able to decide the “questions of law and fact” inherent in
privateering-related cases than were executive branch officers. 119 In
addition, putting the privateering question before the courts—the
ultimate expositor of the law—would serve to apprise those involved
of precisely what conduct was permissible. 120 Most importantly,
judicial resolution of disputes over privateer captures was not only
sensible, it was obligatory. Under the American constitutional scheme,
“[q]uestions of property between Individuals” were not for the
executive to decide; they “are ascribed to the Judiciary alone.”121
Jefferson assured French officials, however, that the federal courts
would faithfully apply the general principles of the law of nations and
maritime law and that the resulting judgment would be no different
than one that would be obtained in France “or in any other country
of Europe.” 122
Within the cabinet, Jefferson’s position won out, as the President
decided that the government would not intercede to see the prizes
restored. 123 Though Hamilton still had his reservations, he ultimately
agreed that “the experiment of a reference to the Civil Tribunal” on
the privateering question was advisable, for the lack of “some
competent judicial authority to do justice between parties” would
leave “a great chasm in the law.” 124 If nothing else, the cases would
likely turn on “nice points” of fact and questions about the extent of
the United States’ territorial waters, ones “which the Courts had
best settle.” 125

(June 21, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 19, at 153 (“[T]ribunals are instituted to render justice
between individuals, and not to . . . decide on the political relations which exist between nation
and nation.”).
119. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (June 13, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 270, 270–71.
120. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond-Charles Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 297, 297–300.
121. Id. at 301.
122. Id.
123. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Vans Murray (May 21, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 77.
124. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King (June 15, 1793), in 14 HAMILTON
PAPERS, supra note 28, at 547, 547–48.
125. Id. at 548.
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While British officials had doubts of their own, they soon came to
recognize that the executive branch’s noninterventionist position
made recourse to the judiciary a necessity. 126 Accordingly, lawyers in
several port cities began filing suit under the federal courts’ admiralty
jurisdiction seeking restoration of British vessels allegedly captured in
violation of United States neutrality. 127
The fundamental question in these cases was whether the courts
had jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs’ allegations. 128 Echoing the
arguments made by French officials, lawyers for the captors sought
dismissals on the ground that, under the laws of war, the validity of
the captures could only be adjudicated by French tribunals. 129 The
plaintiffs’ lawyers—channeling Jefferson—countered with a paean to
judicial integrity and the rule of law. Though “despotic sovereignties”
could regulate such claims through force, in a “government of laws”
the best way to effect restitution was through admiralty proceedings
in federal court. 130 Properly-constituted tribunals operating under the
law and customs of civilized nations were less likely than executive
officers to become “entangled in political considerations,” and
considerations of comity and reciprocity ensured that court judgments
would be given “particular respect” abroad. 131
The judges were not convinced. The leading case was decided by
Richard Peters, one of the nation’s foremost jurists and an experienced
admiralty judge. 132 Peters acknowledged that, as a general matter,

126. See Letter from Benjamin Moodie to Lord Grenville (Dec. 17, 1794), UKNA-FO
ser. 5, 6:140 (recognizing that recourse to the executive would be pointless without first having
pursued judicial remedies); Letter from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (June 14,
1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 285 (indicating that he had followed
Jefferson’s “recommendation” that the owners of a captured British vessel be instructed to seek
recovery in federal court).
127. See, e.g., Findlay v. William, 9. F. Cas. 57 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 4790); Moxon v. Fanny,
17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895); see also Letter from George Hammond to Lord
Grenville (June 8, 1794), UK National Archives, Foreign Office Records, America, ser. 5, 1:175
[hereinafter UKNA-FO] (describing his role in initiating litigation).
128. See Findlay, 9 F. Cas. at 59 (stating that “the only point . . . to determine . . . [is]
[w]hether this court is vested with the power to enquire into the legality of the prize.”).
129. See id. at 57–58.
130. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 58–59.
132. See Presser, supra note 61, at 34–40 (discussing Peters); see also Castello v. Bouteille,
5 F. Cas. 278, 280 (D. S.C. 1794) (No. 2504) (noting that Peters, who authored the Findlay v.
Williams opinion, is a “[r]espectable character for legal knowledge” and equating his “sound
argument and clear deduction” with the writings of preeminent law of nations publicists).
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restitution to the victims was the proper remedy for captures made in
violation of neutrality, 133 but he found that the weight of international
legal authority clearly supported the captors’ position that the courts
of a neutral nation could not adjudicate the validity of a prize of war.134
Any redress for French violations of United States neutrality was to be
obtained via diplomatic negotiation. 135 Expressing confidence that
French admiralty courts would render justice to the plaintiffs, 136 Peters
dismissed the case—and several others plaintiffs filed in his court 137—
and other district court judges did likewise. 138
Though these dismissals were primarily based on a straightforward
application of existing legal doctrine, the judges’ opinions made clear
that prudential considerations loomed large. Judge Peters fully
appreciated the delicate position in which the United States found
itself, 139 and even acknowledged that judicial resolution of
privateering-related disputes could, in theory, be diplomatically
beneficial. 140 Nevertheless, in his view “political convenience” could

133. Findlay, 9 F. Cas. at 59; see also Moxon v. Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 946 (D. Pa. 1793)
(No. 9895) (stating that “[n]eutral courts or private individuals, are not clothed with authority
to vindicate or carry on national contests.”).
134. Findlay, 9 F. Cas. at 61; see also Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 946.
135. See Findlay, 9 F. Cas. at 59–60.
136. See id. at 60 (“It is to be expected by one power from another, that her courts and
her administration will do justice to the rights of sovereignty and neutrality.”). In fact, one of
the reasons judges gave for declining jurisdiction was to avoid encouraging what would
effectively be collateral attacks on prize adjudications made by French authorities. See William
Paca, William Paca’s District Court Opinion, MD. J., Aug. 15, 1793, as reprinted in 6 DHSC,
supra note 2, at 324, 332.
137. See Findlay, 9 F. Cas. at 62; Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 948; McCurach v. Mary, decree
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 1793), NARA, Admiralty Case Files for E.D. of Pa., 1789–1840, microfilm
M988 [hereinafter Pennsylvania Admiralty].
138. See JAMES DUANE, DECREE ON THE ADMIRALTY SIDE OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF
NEW YORK 30, 35 (New York, Francis Childs & John Swaine 1794); Castello v. Bouteille, 5 F.
Cas. 278, 279–80 (D. S.C. 1794) (No. 2504); William Paca, supra note 136; BOS. GAZETTE,
Aug. 5, 1793, at 2. But see Folger v. L’Ecuyer (D. Mass. 1793), reprinted in COLUMBIAN
CENTINEL, Jan. 4, 1794, at 1 (concluding that the court had jurisdiction over a libel filed by the
American captain of a captured British whaling vessel, on the theory that it was the “duty of the
sovereign power to protect the rights of [its] citizens”).
139. See Findlay, 9 F. Cas. at 59 (“It is difficult for a neutral nation, with the best
dispositions, so to conduct itself as not to displease one or the other of belligerent parties.”);
Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 944 (noting that the case turned on “a point of public consequence”).
140. See Findlay, 9 F. Cas. at 59–60 (noting the possible “necessity” of judicially deciding
the case).
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not serve as the basis for judicial intervention in the affairs of state. 141
Not only was such intervention unwarranted by law, it risked
offending one party or the other. 142 The surest way for Americans to
demonstrate their impartiality, in fact, was “to confine ourselves to the
customs of other nations in our predicament,” which necessitated
declining jurisdiction over French captures. 143 Otherwise, the
belligerents might use claims grounded in neutral rights as the basis
for “a war of suits” in federal court. 144
The district courts’ determination that they did not have
jurisdiction over privateer captures was a blow to the Washington
administration’s hope that questions respecting the restoration of
prizes could be decided judicially rather than politically. In the wake
of the dismissals, British officials redoubled their demands that the
executive branch intervene to restore seized ships, 145 while French
officials asserted all the more stridently their exclusive authority to
dispose of such captures. 146 Having been repeatedly rebuffed in its
attempts to recruit the courts into management of the privateering
controversy, it became increasingly clear that the executive would need
to take matters more fully in hand. As Washington exasperatedly
proclaimed to his cabinet, unless some “effectual mode” was adopted
to prevent French privateers from arming in United States ports, “the
Executive of the United States [would] be incessantly harassed with
complaints on this head.” 147
All was not lost, however. As several district court judges had
noted, theirs was not the last word on the question of jurisdiction over
privateer captures; the issue’s “novelty and importance,” one averred,
141. Id. at 60; see also Castello, 5 F. Cas. at 279 (“The constitution has wisely separated
the judicial and executive departments, and we must not infringe the barriers.”); Moxon, 17 F.
Cas. at 948 (“I should very willingly relieve [the executive] from part of the burthens thrown
upon [it] by the unhappy contests among other nations; but my views of the powers of this court
forbid my interference.”).
142. See Findlay, 9 F. Cas. at 60.
143. Id. at 59.
144. Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 946.
145. See, e.g., Letter from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 7, 1793), in 27
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 318 (asking administration to restore a captured ship to
its owners).
146. See, e.g., Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 13, 1793),
in 27 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 103–05 (arguing that French consuls have exclusive
jurisdiction over French prizes).
147. Letter from George Washington to the Cabinet (July 29, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 582.
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made it “worthy of a much higher tribunal than that of a single
judge.” 148 Such hints no doubt buoyed hopes within the cabinet that
judicial intervention might yet be forthcoming. In a letter to the
United States minister in Paris, Jefferson noted that the jurisdictional
question was “not yet perfectly settled,” and that “an appeal to the
Court of last resort [would] decide it finally.” 149
III. THE COURTS IN CONFLICT
Jefferson’s comment was prescient. In its first privateering case in
early 1794, the Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling denying
jurisdiction over a French capture, raising the possibility that federal
courts would be available to adjudicate such claims. 150 British officials,
frustrated in their attempts to secure redress from the executive
branch, eagerly accepted the Court’s invitation to press their
arguments before the federal bench. 151 And while their French
counterparts complained bitterly that courts had no role to play in
wartime disputes between sovereign nations, the Washington
administration consistently rejected French demands that the
executive interfere in matters the administration insisted were properly
reserved to the judiciary. 152 The courts therefore soon became the
primary forum through which disputes over French privateering
were resolved.
The judicial embrace of a more prominent role in the privateering
controversy was far from whole-hearted, however. As appeals from
privateering lawsuits began to crowd its docket, the Supreme Court
was forced to confront the Neutrality Crisis’s full implications.
Struggling to reconcile the necessity of safeguarding American
neutrality against the need to conform its decisions to the norms and
practices of other nations, the Court limited the extent to which
privateer activity in the United States could serve as the basis for claims
to captured property. 153 At the same time, the Court took steps to

148. DUANE, supra note 138, at 4; see also Findlay, 9 F. Cas. at 61 (“There is an appeal,
from any determination I may give, to a superior tribunal.”).
149. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 704.
150. Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 180–89.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 196–203.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 214–21.
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protect its own institutional interests by narrowing the scope of its
reviewing authority in admiralty appeals to questions of law only. 154 In
so doing, the justices signaled their intent to define the Court as the
ultimate arbiter of legal questions under the Constitution.
A.

Opening the Door to Litigation

In February 1794, the Court decided its first case involving a
French privateer capture, Glass v. Sloop Betsey. The Betsey was a Swedish
vessel carrying Swedish and American cargo, captured in July 1793 by
a French privateer armed in Charleston. The owners of some of the
Betsey’s cargo sought help from the Washington administration in
recovering their property, 155 but Jefferson replied that “remedy in the
courts of justice” was the only one to which they had access. 156 After
the district court dismissed their suit on jurisdictional grounds,
Jefferson rebuffed the owners’ second request for executive
intervention. 157 When Justice William Paterson—acting in his capacity
as circuit court judge—affirmed the district court’s dismissal on
appeal, 158 the stage was set for consideration by the full Court. 159
Despite four days of learned argument respecting the federal
courts’ jurisdiction under domestic and international law, the Court’s
decree reversing the lower courts was brief and opaque. 160 It contained
no reasoning and no citations to authority, so determining precisely
what it held presents a bit of a puzzle. 161 On its face, the ruling as to
the federal district courts’ jurisdiction over privateering cases was very
broad, in that it affirmed their enjoyment of “all the powers of a court

154. See infra text accompanying notes 230–37.
155. See Letter from Lucas Gibbes & Alexander S. Glass to Thomas Jefferson (July 8,
1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 453 (asking that the vessel and cargo be
delivered to their agent in Baltimore).
156. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Söderström (Nov. 20, 1793), in 27
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 409.
157. Commentary on Glass v. Sloop Betsey, in 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 296, 301–05.
158. See Extract of a Letter from Easton, to a Gentleman in this Town, COLUMBIAN
CENTINEL (Bos.), Nov. 30, 1793, at 2 (reporting the basis for Paterson’s decision).
159. Commentary on Glass v. Sloop Betsey, supra note 157, at 307.
160. Glass v. Sloop Betsey, Decree of the Supreme Court (Feb. 18, 1794), reprinted in 6
DHSC, supra note 2, at 347–48. The Court added that foreign nations had no right to erect
prize tribunals in the United States, unless by special agreement; as the existing treaties with
France did not include such a provision, the jurisdiction exercised by the consuls of France was
“not of right.” Id.
161. See Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy, supra note 12, at 170–71.
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of Admiralty.” 162 That formulation, however, only begged the central
question: Did the powers of a federal admiralty court include the
ability to examine the validity of a high-seas capture of a neutral vessel
made by a belligerent power at war? Because the district court had
answered “no” to that question, the reversal of that judgment by the
Supreme Court and the remand for further proceedings necessarily
meant that the answer was “yes.” But how far this principle extended
was by no means clear.
Though modern-day observers generally understand Glass to have
definitively extended the federal courts’ jurisdiction over all captures
that violated United States neutrality, 163 the ruling actually left open
more questions than it answered. Contemporaries were confused as to
what the Court actually held, 164 and were uncertain regarding how far
the courts’ jurisdiction now extended. 165 As we shall see, the difficulty
162. This statement was likely meant to respond to the captor’s argument that the Judiciary
Act’s grant of jurisdiction in “civil and maritime” cases did not extend to cases involving prizes
of war. Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 12, 16 (1794). This argument may have
informed Justice Paterson’s reasoning on the circuit court. Commentary on Glass v. Sloop Betsey,
supra note 157, at 310 n.69.
163. See, e.g., WARREN, supra note 78, at 117 (“No decision of the Court ever did more
to vindicate our international rights, to establish respect amongst other nations for the
sovereignty of this country, and to keep the United States out of international complications.”);
CASTO, SUPREME COURT, supra note 12, at 82–87; Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy, supra note 12,
at 161; HYNEMAN, supra note 6, at 91; Reinstein, supra note 6, at 419 (stating that Glass gave
district courts “authority over foreign captures and the power to order restitution for illegally
seized prizes”); Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 6, at 1023–27; Sylvester, supra note 31, at
34 (“By this one announcement, the Supreme Court was able to ensure federal court jurisdiction
over all prize cases arising under the law of nations.”).
164. Some observers believed that the Court had decided that district courts had
jurisdiction over captures made within United States territory, Letter from George Hammond
to Lord Grenville (Feb. 22, 1794), UKNA-FO ser. 5, 4:43; Opinion of Peter S. DuPonceau
(July 9, 1794), AMAE, Boston Consulate, box 71, La Catherine, even though the district court
had determined, as a factual matter, that the vessel had been seized on the high seas,
Commentary on Glass v. Sloop Betsey, supra note 157, at 302. On the other hand, French officials
apparently thought the decision in Glass concerned only their consuls’ authority to judge the
validity of prizes brought into the United States, Décisions de la Cour Suprème des E.U. (Feb.
19, 1794) (1 Ventôse An 2), AMAE-CP, 40:103, but that question was not argued by the
parties, Glass, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 15–16, and was addressed by the Court in dicta, id. at 16.
165. See Hollingsworth v. Betsey, 12 F. Cas. 348, 351 (D. Pa. 1795) (No. 6612)
(expressing doubt, even after Glass, about the propriety of federal judges taking cognizance of
claims of capture between belligerents); Dubois v. Brig Kitty, plea to jurisdiction (Feb. 25, 1794),
NARA, Pennsylvania Admiralty, supra note 137 (making the argument, subsequent to Glass,
that the court did not have the authority to restore a captured vessel to its owners); Letter from
Peter S. DuPonceau to Martin Jorris (Apr. 8, 1795), in 1 DUPONCEAU LETTERBOOKS 58
(Historical Society of Pennsylvania) [hereinafter DuPonceau Letterbooks] (noting that Glass said
nothing definitive about federal court jurisdiction over prizes captured outside United States
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of drawing that boundary would bedevil the Court for years
to come. 166
Glass’s inscrutability also points to a more fundamental question
about the Court’s motivations. On its face, the jurisdictional ruling
seems surprising, as it contravened the near-unanimous opinion of
district court judges 167 as well as the position taken by Justice Paterson
on circuit only a few months earlier. 168 The Court’s failure to cite to
any authority or offer any reasoning only highlighted the extent to
which the decision stood in tension with the fundamental precept that
only the tribunals of the capturing nation had the authority to judge
the validity of a prize of war. 169 It is of little surprise that contemporary
observers understood the decision to have been prompted by
considerations of “political expediency.” 170
But what were the “politics” that prompted the Court to
contravene established international practice and open the door to
federal court resolution of the privateering dispute? Though there is
no direct evidence of the justices’ thinking, it seems clear that the
Court was responding to the need to provide some mechanism for the
resolution of British claims arising from French privateering.
By the time Glass was decided, Anglo-American relations were at
their nadir. In addition to the numerous points of contention between
the two nations that festered in the wake of American independence,
the outbreak of war with France had given rise to new tensions,

territory, nor about the courts’ authority to restore vessels captured in violation of United
States neutrality).
166. See infra Section III.C.
167. See supra notes 132–44 and accompanying text.
168. The Court’s decision was apparently unanimous, Glass v. Sloop Betsey, Decree of the
Supreme Court, supra note 160, at 347–48 (noting that the Court was “decidedly of opinion”
and “clearly of opinion” on the substantive questions), and Paterson did not register any
objections to the reversal of his ruling on circuit, Commentary on Glass v. Sloop Betsey, supra
note 157, at 310 n.69.
169. See CASTO, SUPREME COURT, supra note 12, at 109 (describing Glass as a case in
which “the Court was willing to issue a fiat overturning settled admiralty law with little or
no explanation”).
170. Opinion of J.S. Martin (July 10, 1794), AMAE, Boston Consulate, box 71, La
Catherine; see also Opinion of J.S. Martin (July 7, 1794), AMAE, Boston Consulate, box 71, La
Catherine (averring that Glass had “more political than legal ground for its support” and that
“able lawyers among themselves dissented from the opinion”); cf. Letter from Peter S.
DuPonceau to John Y. Noel (Aug. 1, 1795), in 1 DUPONCEAU LETTERBOOKS, supra note 165,
at 108 (noting that the precise scope of the federal courts’ authority to entertain claims depended
largely on “the political opinions of the day”).
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including mounting British anger over French privateering activities.
The state of relations had become so critical by early 1794 that British
provocations in the Northwest and the Caribbean had brought the
two nations to the brink of war, and Washington felt compelled to
send Chief Justice Jay to London to negotiate a treaty and hopefully
avert open hostilities. 171
But why was the judiciary necessarily the institution of
government to address British complaints? As numerous
contemporaries—including Alexander Hamilton—had argued,
violations of neutrality were generally understood to be matters of
state to be resolved by government-to-government negotiation, not
questions of law to be adjudicated by courts. 172
The answer is twofold. As indicated earlier, the Washington
administration’s initial effort to have privateering disputes adjudicated
in federal court was driven in part by a disinclination within the cabinet
to take action against either British or French interests. 173 By the time
Glass was decided, British officials understood that the executive
branch was incapable of satisfactorily addressing British claims even if
it wanted to. In the wake of the district courts’ denial of jurisdiction
over British claims, the Washington administration had moved to
intervene more directly to resolve the many disputes cropping up
along the eastern seaboard. It issued a set of substantive rules
prohibiting American participation in French privateering 174 and

171. On Anglo-American relations and the particular circumstances of Jay’s mission, see
SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY’S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY (1923);
JERALD A. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS
(1970); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 5, at 375–96.
172. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text; DUANE, supra note 138, at 26–32
(discussing European cases in which neutrality violations in maritime captures were addressed by
executive, not judicial, authority).
173. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.
174. Rules on Neutrality (Aug. 3, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at
608, 609–10.
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sought to remedy its own lack of enforcement power 175 by delegating
responsibility to state and local federal officials. 176
The administration’s attempt to leverage local law enforcement
resources to restrain French privateering was largely ineffective. In
many cases state and federal officials could do little to prevent wellarmed vessels of war from doing as they pleased. 177 And while a
number of governors appear to have taken their new law enforcement
responsibilities to heart, 178 others were less inclined to follow orders
from the federal executive, 179 especially when such actions threatened
serious diplomatic consequences. 180 To make matters worse, the

175. See Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson,
Henry Knox & Edmund Randolph (July 29, 1793), in 15 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 28,
at 144 (expressing his concern that the executive would be “incessantly harrassed [sic] with
complaints” from the victims of French privateering); Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph
Fauchet (Oct. 22, 1794), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 19, at 589 (noting that the United States’
sheer size made cabinet resolution of individual cases impossible); see generally LEONARD D.
WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (1948) (noting the limited
institutional resources of the federal government under Washington).
176. See Treasury Department Circular to the Collectors of the Customs (Aug. 4, 1793),
in 15 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 28, at 178–81 (instructing customs collectors to report
neutrality infractions to the governor and local federal district attorney for resolution);
Instructions to the District Attorneys [undated], in 27 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 340
(charging the district attorneys with collecting the evidence governors would consider in
deciding on restoration); cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (Sept. 5,
1793), in 27 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 36–37 (asking British minister Hammond to
instruct the consuls under his supervision to provide government officers with information
regarding alleged neutrality infractions).
177. See Letter from Governor of Virginia to Edmund Randolph (Feb. 12, 1795), in 1
ASPFR, supra note 19, at 606 (noting the lack of “effectual means” to prevent violations by
“citizens or subjects of the belligerent nations”); Report of David Robinett (Jan. 5, 1795), in 1
ASPFR, supra note 19, at 632 (describing incident in which a French privateer forcibly resisted
a seizure attempt by federal officers).
178. See Letter from Governor Samuel Huntington to Sir John Temple (Sept. 3, 1793),
UKNA-FO ser. 5, 2:69 (agreeing to restore a British vessel to its owners); Letter from Sir John
Temple to Governor George Clinton (Aug. 18, 1793), UKNA-FO ser. 5, 2:67 (seeking
information regarding a prize that Clinton had retaken from its French captors).
179. See Letter from Thomas Sim Lee to Thomas Jefferson (May 20, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 67 (showing the governor of Maryland noting his own
“incompetency in point of authority to interfere” with a privateer capture); Letter from Isaac
Shelby to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 13, 1794), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 19, at 455–56 (the
governor of Kentucky asserting doubts about whether he had “any legal authority to restrain or
punish” French citizens raising troops for an intended incursion into Spanish territory along
the Mississippi).
180. See Letter from Thomas MacDonogh to Lord Grenville (Nov. 14, 1793), UKNA-FO
ser. 5, 2:269 (explaining that the Massachusetts governor declined to interdict a French privateer
fitting out in Boston from the “apprehension of taking a wrong step”).
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administration’s parallel effort to secure legislation from Congress to
strengthen United States neutrality was thwarted by partisan
politics. 181 Republican opposition delayed the law’s passage for several
months and stripped it of its most important provisions, 182 including
those specifically requested by the President that would have
definitively established federal court jurisdiction over disputes arising
from privateer captures. 183
Accordingly, one way to read the decision in Glass—as several
scholars have—is to view it as the Supreme Court’s effort to bolster
the administration’s diplomatic position by paving the way for British
victims of French privateering to seek in federal court the recourse

181. See Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate and House of
Representatives (Dec. 3, 1793), in 14 WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra note 93, at 462, 462–63
(noting that the penalties under the law of nations for neutrality violations were often either
“inadequate” or “indistinctly marked”).
182. The Neutrality Act, as it came to be known, provided criminal penalties for Americans
who engaged in hostilities against a country with which the United States was at peace and for
those involved in fitting out ships with the intent of committing such hostilities. An Act in
Addition to the Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, June 5,
1794, 1 Stat. 381 [hereinafter Neutrality Act of 1794]. Though these provisions obviated any
further debate about whether such activities were punishable as violations of federal common
law, prosecutions continued to be rare. See United States v. Guinet, 26 F. Cas. 53 (Pa. C.C.
1795) (noting conviction of the defendant for his involvement in the arming of a privateer in
Delaware); cf. Kevin Arlyck, Plaintiffs v. Privateers: Litigation and Foreign Affairs in the Federal
Courts, 1816–1822, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 245, 258–62 (2012) (discussing the federal
government’s more concerted effort in the 1810s to use the Neutrality Act as a basis for
prosecutions against Americans who participated in privateering against Spain on behalf of
revolutionary governments in South America, but again with limited success).
183. See Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate and House of
Representatives (Dec. 3, 1793), in 14 WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra note 93, at 462, 463–64
(stating that because “several of the Courts have doubted . . . their power to liberate . . .
vessels . . . it would seem proper to regulate their jurisdiction in these points”). The original
bill—drafted by the administration—gave the courts jurisdiction over claims involving the
capture of American and other neutral vessels; but, for reasons unknown, James Madison and
others fought to have the provision excluded, and it was removed at some point during the
legislative proceedings. CASTO, FIGHTING SAIL, supra note 6, at 159–62; see also Neutrality Act
of 1794, § 6, 1 Stat. 381, 384 (granting the federal courts jurisdiction only over captures made
within United States territorial waters). Nor did the law explicitly give the courts the authority
to restore vessels captured by privateers who had violated one of the law’s substantive
prohibitions, so even in cases where jurisdiction was proper, a private claimant’s ability to secure
a meaningful remedy remained in doubt. See Letter from Peter S. DuPonceau to Martin Jorris
(Apr. 8, 1795), in 1 DUPONCEAU LETTERBOOKS, supra note 165, at 58 (expressing doubts
about the courts’ authority to restore vessels captured in violation of United States neutrality);
cf. Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319, 319 (1796) (Ellsworth, C.J.)
(questioning whether “an augmentation of force [within the United States] could be
deemed . . . a sufficient cause for restitution” of a seized vessel).
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they were unable to secure through political channels. 184 Such an
explanation accords with general accounts of the judicial role in early
foreign affairs that characterize the courts as a willing adjunct to the
executive in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. 185
Thus, it is important to recognize the limited nature of the Court’s
decision in Glass. If the goal was to ensure that British complaints over
French privateering would be resolved judicially, on its face the
decision did little. Because the captured ship was Swedish-American
owned, the ruling at most indicated that federal district courts had
jurisdiction to consider claims from Americans (and perhaps other
neutrals) victimized by French privateering. 186 Such a holding, of
course, offered little benefit to British property owners seeking to
recover their vessels and cargo by suit in federal court. Moreover, the
opinion did not address the argument that, by treaty, the courts were
expressly precluded from inquiring into French captures. 187 By not
addressing such issues, the Court ensured that future British
attempts to recover property through the courts would face
continued obstacles. 188
Glass therefore seems best understood as a prudential nondecision—akin to the one the justices took regarding the advisory

184. See, e.g., CASTO, SUPREME COURT, supra note 12, at 109 (asserting that in Glass the
Court contravened established legal doctrine in the interest of “national security”); Wythe Holt,
Separation of Powers? Relations Between the Judiciary and the Other Branches of the Federal
Government Before 1803, in NEITHER SEPARATE NOR EQUAL: CONGRESS IN THE 1790S 183–
210 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2000); Maeva Marcus, Is the Supreme
Court a Political Institution?, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 95 (2003).
185. See supra notes 12–14.
186. The libellants in the case were American and Swedish owners of the cargo on board
the Betsey when she was captured. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 301; see also supra note 138 (noting
that, prior to Glass, a district court had endorsed the theory that it had jurisdiction over claims
brought by Americans).
187. See Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 6–15 (1794) (argument of counsel);
Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 14, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 281.
188. The Court may have thought the treaty question was not properly presented, given
that Article 17 prohibited the examination of prizes captured from France’s “enemies,” and the
Betsey was a neutral vessel carrying neutral cargo. But in the Court’s early years the justices
routinely opined on legal questions not directly implicated in the case at bar, see generally JAY,
supra note 8, at 77–112, and even did so in Glass itself, see 3 U.S. at 15–16 (opining on French
consular authority to condemn prizes in the United States, even though that question was not
addressed by the courts below nor by counsel at argument). In addition, given that the captors
alleged that the Betsey was in fact a British vessel, 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 321, there was ample
justification for the Glass Court to address Article 17’s implications for such claims.
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opinion—meant to deflect the most critical questions regarding the
federal courts’ authority in foreign relations matters. There can be no
doubt that the Court was aware of the neutrality legislation then
pending in Congress, and the justices would have had reason to
believe that the legislature would resolve the finer jurisdictional
questions raised by litigation over French captures. 189 It therefore
makes sense that the Court said—and decided—as little as possible.190
At the same time, the justices were certainly aware of the
Washington administration’s struggles to enforce its own neutrality
rules. Accordingly, the Court was careful not to foreclose the
possibility that federal admiralty jurisdiction was sufficiently expansive
to include claims to British property captured by French privateers. By
leaving the door open to further British suits, the Court ensured that
the claims of a powerful foreign constituency would receive an
audience within the federal government, without irrevocably
committing the judiciary to fulfilling that role going forward. And
although significant uncertainty remained regarding the full scope of
the courts’ authority, for the victims of French privateering, the
courthouse door was now ajar.
B.

A Proxy War in Federal Court

In Glass’s wake, British officials began a concerted effort to use
litigation in federal court as a means of undermining French
privateering. Political and military developments in the broader
transatlantic conflict between France and Great Britain caused a surge
in privateering activity in 1794, 191 and British officials became
increasingly alarmed as vessels and cargo seized by privateers operating
from the United States made their way into ports across the eastern
seaboard. 192 The British lacked confidence that the Washington

189. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (noting President Washington’s request
that Congress “regulate” the federal courts’ jurisdiction over privateering cases).
190. See GOEBEL, supra note 96, at 765 (suggesting that the Court’s minimalist decree in
Glass was “no doubt prudent” in light of pending Congressional action).
191. See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 68–86 (explaining increased French need for privateers
to solidify its military gains in the Caribbean).
192. See Letter from George Hammond to Lord Grenville (Sep. 5, 1794), UKNA-FO ser.
5, 5:275 (noting that there had been “no diminution” in privateering activity in Charleston);
Letter from Benjamin Moodie to Phineas Bond (Dec. 17, 1794), UKNA-FO ser. 5, 6:140
(describing the difficulties he faced in keeping track of all the privateers emanating from
southern ports).
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administration had either the will or the means to effectively respond
to the rise in French privateering. Having witnessed first-hand the
ineffectiveness of the administration’s attempt to enforce its rules
through state and local federal officials, British observers reasonably
doubted whether the executive possessed the “energy” necessary to
compel compliance with the obligations of neutrality even if it had the
desire to do so. 193
British skepticism was well founded. Not only had executive
branch enforcement proven ineffective in practice, 194 but following the
Court’s decision in Glass, the Washington administration’s policy on
the restoration of captured property explicitly shifted in favor of
judicial resolution. Though intervention by state and federal officials
in prize disputes did not cease entirely, 195 by late 1794 the
administration’s stated approach was to leave such controversies to the
courts, at least when they had “jurisdiction to inquire into the
affair.” 196 To the British, the administration’s point was clear: filing suit
in federal court had become “the only medium[] thro’ which Justice
[wa]s to be obtained.” 197
Accordingly, in late 1794, British consuls in the United States
began a concerted effort to use federal court litigation as a means of
recovering captured vessels and cargo. The British legal campaign was
not simply aimed at securing recompense for individual victims,
however; the goal was to undermine the French privateering effort
more broadly, by preventing captors from enjoying the profits of their

193. Letter from John Hamilton to Lord Grenville (June 26, 1794), UKNA-FO ser. 5,
6:219; see also Letter from George Hammond to Lord Grenville (Oct. 12, 1793), UKNA-FO
ser. 5, 1:329 (asserting that federal officials were forced to resort to “half-measures and empty
assertions of authority” in their attempts to restrain French privateers).
194. See supra notes 174–18080 and accompanying text.
195. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet (Sept. 27, 1794), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 19, at 588 (noting that the Rhode Island governor had determined that a prize
captured by a French privateer would be given over to the captors).
196. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Governors of the Several States (Oct. 22, 1794),
in 1 ASPFR, supra note 19, at 589–90.
197. Letter from Phineas Bond to Lord Grenville (Jan. 27, 1795), UKNA-FO ser. 5,
10:35; see also Letter from Benjamin Moodie to Lord Grenville (Dec. 17, 1794), UKNA-FO
ser. 5, 6:140 (describing his realization that the administration did not consider itself obligated
to act on privateering-related complaints unless suit had first been filed in the courts); Letter
from George Hammond to Lord Grenville (June 8, 1794), UKNA-FO ser. 5, 5:59 (stating that
filing suit was “the most probable and speedy mode of effecting . . . restitution” of
captured ships).
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ventures and therefore crippling future operations. 198 Though
concerns over litigation costs induced British officials to be somewhat
selective in choosing which cases to prosecute, 199 in general they
demonstrated great willingness to transform the federal courts into a
new front in the maritime war raging across the Atlantic. 200
In order for this strategy to work, however, the courts had to be
open to British claims. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Glass appeared to carve out a narrow exception to the general
principle that neutral courts could not take cognizance of claims
arising from wartime captures, 201 as did the neutrality legislation
eventually passed by Congress (known as the Neutrality Act). 202 But
neither was especially helpful in achieving the central British objective:
preventing French privateers from using American ports as a base for
launching high-seas attacks on British commerce. Accordingly,
claimants pressed new theories supporting judicial restoration of prizes
seized by privateers in violation of United States neutrality, 203 forcing
198. See Letter from Benjamin Moodie to Phineas Bond (Apr. 28, 1795), UKNA-FO ser.
5 11:101 (characterizing his litigation efforts as being motivated by the entreaties of British
property owners as well as his sense of official duty). Once a suit was filed, the district court took
possession of the prize in question until final disposition, so even if the action ultimately proved
unsuccessful legal proceedings could prevent the captors from profiting from the prize for years.
See Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy, supra note 12, at 182–83 (noting that the time lag between
the filing of the initial libel in thirteen privateering cases and final disposition by the Supreme
Court ranged from eleven to twenty-nine months). Given that privateering was a capitalintensive operation motivated significantly by a desire for personal gain, any significant delay in
realizing a profit from a captured vessel endangered future operations. See Letter from Benjamin
Moodie to Phineas Bond (Apr. 23, 1796), UKNA-FO ser. 5, 15:80 (“[T]he detention of
considerable sums during the Proceedings in the different courts has had as much if not greater
effect in saving British Property than even the success of his Majesty’s Cruizers.”); Letter from
Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 26, 1795), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 19, at 588
(complaining that British litigation “discourage[d] and fatigue[d] the captors”).
199. See Letter from Benjamin Moodie to George Miller (Nov. 28, 1794), UKNA-FO ser.
5, 11:88 (noting litigation’s upfront costs); List of British Vessels carried into Charleston South
Carolina as Prizes, UKNA-FO, ser. 5, 11:91 (indicating that Moodie libeled approximately half
of the British vessels brought into Charleston by privateers in the latter half of 1794).
200. See Letter from Benjamin Moodie to George Miller (Nov. 28, 1794), supra note 199
(expressing his determination to libel every vessel within his purview when “there [wa]s any
prospect of recovering them”); Letter from Benjamin Moodie to Phineas Bond (Apr. 23, 1796),
supra note 198 (indicating that he would appeal all cases lost in the district court).
201. See Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 9 (1794) (ruling that the district court
had jurisdiction over the capture of a vessel carrying American and other neutral property).
202. See Neutrality Act of 1794, ch. 50, § 6, 1 Stat. 384 (1794) (granting the district
courts jurisdiction over captures occurring within the United States’ territorial waters).
203. See, e.g., Williamson v. The Betsey, 30 F. Cas. 7, 7 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 17750)
(noting libellant’s argument that the capturing privateer “was armed and equipped for war” in
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district court judges to reconcile restrictions on judicial intervention
in privateering matters enshrined in treaty and international practice
with the necessity of safeguarding the nation from war.
Faced with these competing considerations, the lower courts
concluded that although the Treaty of Amity between France and the
United States generally prohibited them from adjudicating the validity
of French captures, 204 privateer violations of United States neutrality
stripped them of the jurisdictional protections afforded them by treaty.
Though the doctrinal basis for this approach was at times somewhat
muddled, 205 American participation in privateering and the arming or
equipping of privateer ships within United States territory were
generally sufficient to establish federal court jurisdiction. 206
The result was a steady erosion of the principle that neutral courts
had no business adjudicating the validity of maritime seizures made by
belligerents at war. When the evidence established that a neutrality
violation of some type had occurred, judges began bypassing the
jurisdictional question altogether, 207 and in some cases privateer

Charleston); Jansen v. The Vrow Christina Magdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356, 356 (D. S.C. 1794) (No.
7216) (arguing that the capturing privateer was commanded by an American); Ormond v. Brig
Somerset, replication (Cir. Ct. Ga. Dec, 22, 1794), NARA, District Court for Georgia, Case
Files (arguing that the capturing privateer was owned by “citizens, subjects, and inhabitants of
the United States”).
204. See Williamson, 30 F. Cas. at 7 (dismissing on jurisdictional grounds suit by owner of
a British ship captured by a French privateer); Stannick v. The Friendship, 22 F. Cas. 1056, 1057
(D.S.C. 1794) (No. 13291) (concluding that article 17 of the Treaty of Amity “expressly
altered” the federal court’s general admiralty jurisdiction by excluding captures made by French
ships of war); Trabudua v. Ship Transmarana, decree (S.D. Ga. Jan. 2, 1795), NARA, Index
Books, 1789-1928, and Minutes and Bench Dockets, 1789-1870, for the S. D. of Ga., microfilm
M1172 (dismissing on jurisdictional grounds suit by owner of a Spanish ship captured by a
French privateer).
205. See, e.g., British Consul v. The Nancy, 4 F. Cas. 171, 171 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1898)
(citing both the Neutrality Act and the more general obligations of the international “laws of
neutrality” as the basis for restoring a captured vessel).
206. See Jansen, 13 F. Cas. at 359 (finding a French-commissioned privateer’s seizure of
an enemy Dutch ship justiciable, despite article 17, because the captain of the privateer was an
American); Kelly v. Schooner Prosperity, in 1 REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF
SOUTH CAROLINA 38–39 (D.S.C. 1794) (restoring a British vessel captured by a French
privateer that had formerly been an American vessel and had illegally left the United States);
Ormond v. Brig Somerset, decree (Cir. Ct. Ga. Dec, 22, 1794), NARA, District Court for
Georgia, Case Files (restoring a British ship captured by the same privateer vessel in Jansen, on
the theory that the privateer was in fact American-owned).
207. See Moodie v. The Betty Carthcart, 17 F. Cas. 651, 651–53 (D.S.C. 1795) (No.
9742) (noting that Article 17’s impact on the court’s jurisdiction was one of the legal questions
requiring resolution, but finding for the libellants without addressing it); The Nancy, 4 F. Cas.
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counsel no longer bothered to even raise the issue. 208 Though district
judges dismissed numerous suits filed by British claimants due to lack
of evidence that a neutrality violation had in fact occurred, 209 by
lowering the jurisdictional barriers formerly imposed by treaty and
custom, the lower court decisions ensured that the British litigants
would have their day in court.
Chagrined by these developments, French officials inundated the
Washington administration with complaints about the damage that
litigation was imposing on their war effort. 210 The core French
position—as it had been all along—was that federal court jurisdiction
over privateer captures violated the two nations’ treaty commitments
and more general principles of sovereign right. 211 While a neutral
nation like the United States might legitimately understand itself to
be obliged to protect British merchants from attacks launched from
within its jurisdiction, that fact did not vest British claimants with
rights that were judicially enforceable. The only way the United States
could seek redress for French neutrality violations was by dealing with
France directly. 212
Officials in the Washington administration continued to
characterize the matter differently. While sovereign nations might
choose to adjust claims respecting violations of neutrality through
diplomacy, such proceedings did not operate to destroy the rights of
at 171 (restoring a vessel captured by a French privateer armed in Charleston without addressing
the captor’s jurisdictional argument).
208. See, e.g., Pintado v. Ship San Joseph; United States v. La Vengeance, in 7 DHSC, supra
note 2, at 526 (indicating that the captors in a New York case did not contest the district
court’s jurisdiction).
209. E.g., British Consul v. The Mermaid, 4 F. Cas. 169, 171 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 1897);
Moodie v. The Brothers, 17 F. Cas. 653, 654 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 9743).
210. Letter from Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph (Sep. 13, 1794), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 19, at 590–91; Letter from Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph (June 8, 1795),
in 1 ASPFR, supra note 19, at 614–15; Letter from Pierre-Auguste Adet to Timothy Pickering
(Nov. 15, 1796), in 1 ASPFR supra note 19, at 579–82.
211. See supra text accompanying note 118.
212. See Letter from Edmond-Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 22, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 339 (“[N]o particular tribunal has the right or power to
interpose itself between two nations.”); Memorandum Regarding Citizen Théric’s Complaints
(Feb. 5, 1796), AMAE, Mémoires et Documents [hereinafter AMAE-MD], 39:36 (arguing that
alleged violations of United States neutrality could only be addressed via “government to
government negotiation,” and “under no circumstances” could courts take cognizance of such
matters); Ministère des Relations Extérieures to Victor Dupont (Apr. 23, 1796), AMAE-CCC,
Charleston, 2:275 (reiterating the French government’s view that Article 17 of the Treaty of
Amity precluded the federal courts from taking jurisdiction over French prizes).
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private citizens to seek restitution of their property in a court of law. 213
Those rights existed parallel to and independently of sovereign
prerogatives. 214 Though administration officials tacitly acknowledged
that French complaints about legal proceedings were at times
justified, 215 they repeatedly denied any authority to intervene in
judicial proceedings involving private rights to maritime property.216
As Jefferson put it, the courts “exercise the sovereignty of this country
in judiciary matters . . . and [are] liable neither to controul [sic] nor
opposition from any other branch of the Government.” 217
By characterizing questions about the proper disposition of
maritime property seized in wartime as “judiciary matters” to be
resolved by private litigants, rather than political issues to be
negotiated between sovereign governments, the Washington
administration sought to transform a vice into a virtue. The executive’s
inability—or unwillingness—to deal effectively with the privateering
problem was not explained as the result of a deficiency in institutional
capacity or political will. Instead, the Washington administration’s
repeated affirmation of judicial authority and independence was meant
to underscore the government’s fidelity to the rule of law in foreign
affairs. As Jefferson’s successor explained to the French minister, the

213. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond-Charles Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 301 (“By the laws of this Country every individual claiming
a right to any Article of property, may demand process from a court of Justice, and a decision
on the validity of his claim.”).
214. See id. (“[Questions of property between individuals] are ascribed to the Judiciary
alone, and when either persons or property are taken into their custody, there is no power in this
country which can take them out.”).
215. See, e.g., Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet (Sep. 3, 1794), 1 ASPFR,
supra note 19, at 588 (acknowledging possibility that French privateers might be “wantonly
vexed by unjust [judicial] detentions”).
216. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet, supra note 175, at 589 (“If . . .
individuals conceive they have a legal claim upon [a captured ship], and draw her before a court
of law, the Executive of the United States cannot forbid them.”); Letter from Edmund Randolph
to Joseph Fauchet (June 13, 1795), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 19, at 617, 618 (“[Admiralty
courts] are entirely independent of Executive mandates.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Edmond-Charles Genet (June 29, 1793), in 26 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 398, 398
(stating that once a suit had been filed contesting a French capture “there was no power in this
Country which could take the vessel out of the custody of that Court”); Letter from Timothy
Pickering to Pierre-Auguste Adet, (Aug. 25, 1795), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 19, at 631 (“[A]s
long as the [privateering] question in is in the hands of the courts, the Executive cannot
withdraw it from them.”).
217. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond-Charles Genet (Sep. 9, 1793), in 27
JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 1, at 67–68.
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administration’s refusal to intervene was not the result of “any want
of cordiality or friendship” towards France, but instead was due to the
“sovereignty of the law.” 218
Of course, the administration’s characterization of these cases was,
to a certain degree, willfully obtuse; given the high degree of
involvement by both French and British officials, there could be little
doubt that they were waging a proxy battle in federal court. But the
administration’s approach was not entirely ineffective. Though French
officials never endorsed federal court jurisdiction over privateer
captures, over time they displayed a begrudging acceptance of the
reality—if perhaps not the legitimacy—of litigation over privateer
captures. 219 As the British lawsuits worked their way up the appellate
ladder, the justices of the Supreme Court were once again forced to
consider the proper scope of judicial involvement in the affairs of state.
C.

A Conflicted Court

By the time the Supreme Court’s August 1795 term began,
privateering cases brought by British consuls dominated the Court’s
appellate docket. Over the next several terms the Court heard
nineteen cases related to French privateering and ruled in favor of the
French captors in almost all of them. 220 A straightforward tally of wins
and losses, however, elides the difficulties the Court faced in charting
a path through the fraught territory of transatlantic warfare. In several
cases, the justices registered deep concerns about the dangers fostered
by French privateering, but also demonstrated a desire to keep the
Court—and the nation—aligned with international norms governing
relations between sovereigns. 221 This cautious jurisprudence revealed
unease about the privateering litigation’s potential to compromise the

218. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet (Oct. 28, 1794), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 19, at 593, 593.
219. See Letter from Joseph Fauchet to Commissioner of Foreign Relations (Sep. 3, 1794),
in CFM, supra note 21, at 411 (explaining that when French privateers had been wrongly
accused of violating American neutrality he would protest to the executive branch, but adding
that “when there is proof against them I can defend them only with lawyers”); Letter from
Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph, (June 8, 1795), supra note 210, at 615 (admitting “the
right of [U.S.] courts . . . to interfere in [privateering] matters”); see generally Kevin Arlyck, To
Avoid Contestations with American Courts: French Consuls and Maritime War in the United
States, 1793-1797 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) (detailing French
officials’ extensive engagement with war-related federal court litigation during the
Neutrality Crisis).
220. See infra text accompanying notes 240–47.
221. See id.
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Court’s own function as the domestic tribunal of last resort. As the
cases proliferated, the Court took steps to define itself not as an
adjudicator of discrete controversies between foreign litigants but
instead as the arbiter of legal questions respecting the nation’s
foreign relations.
1. Neutrality and legitimacy
Like their district court brethren, the justices of the Supreme
Court had to balance competing demands in adjudicating the
privateering cases that crowded their docket. On the one hand, the
Court’s rulings evinced a deep concern over the degree to which
French privateering activity in the United States threatened the
nation’s peace and safety. On the other, the justices recognized that
privateering was sanctioned by treaty and the law of nations and that
resolution by neutral courts of disputes arising between belligerents
was contrary to customary international practice. In short, as the
Court considered the claims brought before them, it struggled to
decide the cases in a way that helped safeguard United States neutrality
without compromising its own institutional legitimacy.
In service of the first end, the Court affirmed the view that direct
American participation in French privateering, in violation of United
States neutrality, could serve as the basis for restoration of captured
vessels and cargo. 222 In so doing, the justices largely ignored the
question of whether jurisdiction was proper under treaty and
international practice, 223 indicating that the Court would not permit
Americans who compromised United States neutrality to avoid
responsibility for their depredations. In fact, several of the Court’s
decisions in this period sanctioned a form of rough justice, one that
ignored doctrinal niceties in order to ensure that privateers who
engaged in particularly egregious acts did not benefit from
their conduct. 224

222. See Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 152–55 (1795) (Paterson, J.) (concluding
that a capture made by a privateer captained by a United States citizen could be subject
to restitution).
223. See id. at 159 (Iredell, J.) (justifying judicial inquiry into the capture on the ground
that only “lawfully commissioned” French privateers were exempt from jurisdiction under treaty
and the law of nations, and therefore the district court had a “duty” to investigate the facts of
the captor’s status).
224. See Del Col v. Arnold, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 333, 333–35 & n.* (1796) (concluding that
the owners of an American merchant ship looted and abandoned by a French privateer could be
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In explaining the concerns underlying such legally questionable
decisions, 225 Justice Paterson undoubtedly spoke for his brethren in
citing the need to be vigilant against privateer misconduct. Not only
was privateering “licensed depredation . . . that shock[ed] the moral
sense, and disgrace[d] the human character,” 226 but for a neutral
nation to permit such activity within its borders would be “indicative
of an hostile disposition” incompatible with the obligations
neutrality. 227 Echoing the warning Justice Wilson had delivered in his
early grand jury charge, 228 Justice Iredell concurred: “[E]ach Citizen
must conform his conduct” to the dictates of neutrality; otherwise,
“[w]ar might [be] the consequence.” 229 Though criminal prosecutions
against American participants had failed, the Court would not permit
those who “endanger[ed] the neutrality, peace, or safety of the
nation” to reap financial gain from their scurrilous conduct. 230
The Court’s fears regarding the dangers posed by French
privateering were balanced against the need to adjudicate claims
premised on violations of neutrality in accord with legal principles that

compensated from the proceeds from the sale of a British prize lawfully seized by the same
captor); Hills v. Ross, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 331, 332 (1796) (affirming a circuit court ruling that a
mercantile firm involved in the sale of British property captured by American-led privateers had
to pay damages originally assessed against captors themselves); Letter from Peter S. DuPonceau
to Abraham Sasportas (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 126–27 (counseling an
agent for the same privateer vessel as in Hills to abandon another case, even though the privateer
vessel had been sold to a French buyer and had a different captain and new name); cf. also Savage
v. DeLatre, order to show cause (Jan. 12, 1796), reprinted in Columbian Museum (Savannah)
Supp. 1 (Jan. 24, 1797) (requiring privateer owners to show cause why proceeds from the sale
of a legally-captured prize should not be used to compensate the owners of property unlawfully
seized by the same privateer).
225. See L’Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 259 (1816) (noting that the Court’s
decision in Del Col “certainly require[d] an apology”); Letter from Peter S. DuPonceau to John
Y. Noel (Aug. 1, 1795), in 7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 700 (noting his “astonishment” at the
dubious circuit court ruling the Supreme Court affirmed in Hills).
226. William Paterson’s Supreme Court Opinion in Del Col v. Arnold (Aug. 11, 1796), in
7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 680–82. On growing international opposition to the practice of
privateering in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Nicholas Parrillo, The DePrivatization of American Warfare: How the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and Ultimately
Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth Century, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2007).
227. Talbot, 3 U. S. (3 Dall.) at 155.
228. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
229. James Iredell’s Draft of a Supreme Court Opinion in Geyer v. Michel (Mar. 12–14,
1796), in 7 DHSC supra note 2, at 180, 183–84.
230. Talbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 153. Criminal prosecutions initiated against the American
captains of the privateers involved in Talbot both failed. Talbot v. Jansen, in 6 DHSC, supra note
2, at 655–56.
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governed the relations among sovereign nations. For example,
recognizing that the Treaty of Amity necessarily granted French ships
of war some protection against suit in federal court (if not outright
immunity), the Court adopted a narrow view of judicial authority to
restore property that had been seized by privateers in violation of
neutrality. While the wholesale refitting of a privateer in an American
port could serve as the basis for restitution, 231 relatively minor
alterations would not. 232 The Court was not swayed by arguments that
allowing privateers to equip in United States ports was politically
dangerous: “Suggestions of policy and conveniency,” Chief Justice
Ellsworth explained, could not impact “the judicial determination of
a question of right.” 233
Moreover—as Justice Iredell put it—if every “trifling
augmentation” of a privateer’s force could justify a lawsuit, the owners
of property seized on the high seas would be supplied with “an
inexhaustible fund of dispute” with which to invoke the federal courts’
jurisdiction over prizes seized by French privateers. 234 Given that
French courts had “the original & proper jurisdiction” over such
prizes, for courts in the United States to usurp that role “under one
pretext or another” was deeply problematic. 235 The Court, after all,
was well aware of the French position that unwarranted judicial
interference with France’s privateering effort constituted “a direct
attack upon [its] sovereignty and independence.” 236 All the more
231. James Iredell’s Draft of a Supreme Court Opinion in Geyer v. Michel (Mar. 12–14,
1796), in 7 DHSC, supra note 2, 229 at 180, 185 (“An original & entire equipment would be
a gross insult, & ought to be punished . . . . A large & important augmentation may fall under
nearly the same consideration.”).
232. See Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285, 292–96 (1796) (affirming circuit court
ruling that minor alterations to privateer’s equipment was insufficient basis for restitution); The
Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319, 319 (1796) (concluding that because article 19 of the
Treaty of Amity gave French ships the right to visit United States ports for repairs, such repairs
could not justify prize restitution); James Iredell’s Draft of a Supreme Court Opinion in Geyer
v. Michel (Mar. 12–14, 1796), in 7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 185 (“A small and trifling
[augmentation of force] deserves no notice.”); James Iredell’s Notes for a Supreme Court
Opinion in Moodie v. Ship Mermaid (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 112
(concluding that Article 17 shielded prizes made by a privateer fitted out in the United States
when it had subsequently been sold to a French purchaser and granted a valid French
privateering commission).
233. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 319.
234. James Iredell’s Draft of a Supreme Court Opinion in Geyer v. Michel, in 7 DHSC,
supra note 2, at 185–86.
235. Id. at 183–85.
236. Talbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 139.
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reason, Iredell concluded, for the Court to adopt a narrow view of
judicial authority to intervene in disputes between nations at war and
leave such decisions largely to the political branches. 237 Accordingly,
while the Court made clear that judicial relief was available to some
victims of French privateering, respect for international legal norms
and the prerogatives of foreign sovereigns required that the courts’
role in adjudicating wartime claims be carefully circumscribed. 238
2. “A Court of Justice”
International comity was not the justices’ sole concern; their
opinions also reveal a profound anxiety regarding the Court’s role
atop a judicial system threatened with a flood of legally complex, fact
intensive, and diplomatically sensitive cases. Adjudicating privateering
cases usually obliged lower court judges to sift through a great deal of
contradictory evidence in order to determine the facts regarding the
privateer’s construction, repair, armament, crew, sale, and
commissioning. 239 In early cases, the justices—on both the circuit
courts and the Supreme Court—adopted the traditional admiralty
practice of reviewing cases on “appeal,” under which an entire
proceeding was transferred to a superior tribunal for full rehearing
(and sometimes a new trial). 240

237. See James Iredell’s Draft of a Supreme Court Opinion in Geyer v. Michel (Mar. 12–14,
1796), in 7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 185–87 (arguing that questions about prize restoration
were better handled by the other political branches).
238. The substantive impact of this approach was borne out in the results: of the eighteen
privateering cases the Court decided, the captors prevailed in all but two. See Sloss, Judicial
Foreign Policy, supra note 12, at 176–83 (providing a comprehensive summary of the outcomes
in all of the privateering cases). It is important to note that the lopsided numbers reflect a
selection bias: it appears that French privateers rarely appealed cases in which they lost in the
district court, thus their victories in the Supreme Court came almost entirely in cases where they
had already prevailed below. Accordingly, their near-sweep in the Supreme Court did not
indicate that British lawsuits were dead on arrival, though it did clarify that there were significant
limits on the extent to which litigants could base claims to captured property on violations of
United States neutrality.
239. See, e.g., British Consul v. The Mermaid, 4 F. Cas. 169 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 1897);
Moodie v. The Betty Carthcart, 17 F. Cas. 651 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 9742); Moodie v. The
Brothers, 17 F. Cas. 653 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 9743).
240. See Robert Feikema Karachuk, Error or Appeal? Navigating Review Under the
Supreme Court’s Admiralty Jurisdiction, 1789-1800, 27 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 93, 94–96 (2002). The
other mode of review was on a writ of error, in which the superior tribunal only addressed errors
of law apparent on the face of the record. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87 (1789);
see also United States v. Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 108, 110–11 (1812) (“An appeal is a civil
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This holistic approach quickly proved burdensome. The
privateering cases caused a huge spike in the Court’s workload,
accounting for roughly half of the cases on its docket from 1794 to
1797, 241 and resolution often took up a significant portion of the
Court’s time. 242 Moreover, the justices were already significantly
aggrieved by Congress’s refusal to relieve them of their burdensome
circuit-riding duties 243 and had recently displayed pronounced
resistance to legislative attempts to saddle them with additional
administrative responsibilities. 244 Throughout the 1790s, in fact,
displeasure over the onerous demands of the position prompted a
number of candidates to decline appointment to the Court. 245 Little
wonder, then, that at the close of the February 1796 term, Justice
Iredell vented his frustrations over the burdens the privateering cases
imposed: the “petty inquiries” occasioned by such proceedings, he
opined, were not a fit undertaking for “a Court of Justice.” 246
Accordingly, when presented with an opportunity to define itself
more clearly as a “Court of Justice,” the Supreme Court seized it. In

law process, and removes a cause entirely, subjecting the law and fact, to a review and retrial. A
writ of error is a common law process, and removes for re-examination, nothing but the law.”).
241. Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy, supra note 12, at 147.
242. See, e.g., Talbot v. Jansen, in 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 656 (noting that oral argument
in the Talbot case stretched over ten days); James Iredell’s Notes of Arguments in the Supreme
Court in Moodie v. Ship Mermaid, in 7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 86–111 (recording extensive
discussion of facts at argument).
243. See Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court to the Congress of the United States
(Aug. 9, 1792), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 289–90 (protesting that their circuit riding duties
were “a task which considering the extent of the United States, and the small number of Judges,
is too burthensome”); Letter from John Jay to Rufus King (Dec. 19, 1793), in 2 DHSC, supra
note 2, at 434 n.1 (noting that John Jay nearly resigned as Chief Justice in 1792 due to his
displeasure over circuit riding); see generally Holt, supra note 63 (noting that in the 1790s the
justices repeatedly asked Congress to reduce or eliminate the burdens of circuit riding). Traveling
the Southern Circuit—which included the privateering hotspots of Charleston and Savannah—
was considered so onerous that the justices privately agreed to each pay a portion of their own
salaries to the colleague who volunteered for that duty. Spring and Fall Circuits 1794, in 2
DHSC, supra note 2, at 438.
244. See Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial
Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 70–77 (1998) (describing the
controversy over a Congressional plan to have Supreme Court justices review claims to
Revolutionary War pensions).
245. See R.B. Bernstein, President John Adams and Four Chief Justices: An Essay for James
F. Simon, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 441, 448, 456–58 (2012).
246. James Iredell’s Draft of a Supreme Court Opinion in Geyer v. Michel (Mar. 12–14,
1796), in 7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 185; see Talbot v. Jansen, in 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at
656 n.33.
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Wiscart v. Dauchy, the Court ruled that, when reviewing circuit court
decrees in admiralty cases, it was obliged to accept the lower court’s
statement of the facts and was precluded from conducting its own
inquiry. 247 In other words, Supreme Court review in admiralty cases
was restricted to questions of law. Though such a decision seems selfevident now, it was by no means obvious at the time, 248 and the
majority and dissenting opinions illustrate the justices’ divergent views
of the Court’s supervisory role in the federal system.
Justice Wilson argued against the majority’s rule, asserting that it
was “essential to the security and the dignity of the United States”
that a lower court’s conclusions as to both law and fact in admiralty
cases be ratified by the nation’s highest court. 249 His concern was clear:
As the past several years had demonstrated, the proceedings of the
federal courts were closely watched by an international audience, and
it was incumbent upon the Court to ensure the legitimacy of lower
court decisions by subjecting them to plenary review. This, in fact, had
effectively been the Court’s practice to that point. 250
By August 1796, however, a majority of the justices concluded
that wholesale review of lower court decisions was an inappropriate
function for the nation’s highest tribunal. Writing for the Wiscart
247. Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327–28 (1796). Wiscart was not actually a
French privateering case, but it is clear from the context of the August 1796 term that the rule
it announced was deeply informed by those cases the Court was considering at the time. See
Wiscart v. Dauchy, in 7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 734; Karachuk, supra note 240, at 103; see also
Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336, 337 (1797) (holding that the Court
could not investigate the facts in an admiralty case even when the record did not include a
statement from the court below).
248. The relevant constitutional and statutory provisions pointed in different directions.
Article III provided that the Court had appellate jurisdiction “both as to Law and Fact,” except
where Congress prescribed otherwise. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. But while section 21 of the
1789 Judiciary Act specified that “appeals” from the district to circuit court were allowed in
admiralty cases, section 22 provided that all “civil actions” were to be “re-examined . . . in the
Supreme Court” on writ of error only. Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 21–22, 1 Stat. 73, 83–85; see
generally Karachuk, supra note 240, at 94–96 (discussing the confusion over which procedure
was the correct one for securing Supreme Court review).
249. Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 327; see also Jennings, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 337 (arguing
that the majority’s approach in Wiscart would “shut[] the door against light and truth; and . . .
leav[e] the property of the country too much to the discretion and judgment of a single Judge”);
Jennings v. Brig Perseverance, in 7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 817–18 (discussing the Court’s
decision in Jennings).
250. In several of the 1796 privateering cases prior to Wiscart, there were problems with
the lower court’s statement of facts, but the parties agreed to waive their objections in order to
ensure the high court’s full consideration of the weighty issues involved. See Karachuk, supra
note 240, at 96–101.
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majority, Chief Justice Ellsworth argued that such an approach
produced “great private and public inconveniency” and little
additional benefit. 251 Addressing Wilson’s contention that diplomatic
considerations demanded careful scrutiny of lower court decisions,
Ellsworth saw no reason why the justices would be better able to
identify the relevant facts in a case when sitting together in
Philadelphia than they would individually while riding circuit; in either
case, the parties’ claims would be fully considered by “an impartial and
enlightened tribunal” in which they could have full confidence. 252
The Court’s effort to narrow the scope of its review was not simply
an expedient solution to the specific docket-management problem the
privateering cases presented. By the time Wiscart was decided, there
was good reason for the justices to anticipate an incipient end to the
litigation. 253 But the unprecedented crush of cases produced by the
French privateering controversy had offered the justices a glimpse at
how plenary review of all cases subsumed under the federal judiciary’s
expansive admiralty jurisdiction might impact the Court’s role at the
apex of the judicial pyramid. Accordingly, the justices took the
opportunity to establish that their role was not to ensure a correct
outcome in every case that landed on American shores, but instead, in
Ellsworth’s words, “to preserve unity of principle[] in the
administration of justice throughout the United States.” 254
D.

Privateering’s End

In the end, the Court’s cautious approach to the privateering
litigation was a boon for France. The privateers prevailed in nearly
every case that came before the high tribunal. 255 But if the justices
thought that French officials would be mollified, they were wrong:
prevailing on appeal did nothing to change the fact that Britishsponsored litigation had seriously damaged the French war effort by
depriving privateers of their due profits. 256 To make matters worse, the

251. Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 329–30.
252. Id.
253. See infra Section III.D.
254. Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 330.
255. See Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy, supra note 12, at 182.
256. See id. at 182–83 (noting that in thirteen privateering cases the time lag between the
filing of the initial libel and final disposition by the Supreme Court ranged from eleven to twentynine months, and this time lag effectively denied privateers financial gains from their prizes);
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treaty John Jay had recently negotiated with Great Britain (commonly
known as the Jay Treaty) outlawed the sale in the United States of
British vessels captured at sea. 257 Though the treaty helped stabilize
relations with the British, the French viewed it as a decisive
repudiation of the bonds of friendship that had bound France and the
United States together for two decades and retaliated by seizing
American vessels in the Caribbean. 258 Within a year of the final
Supreme Court privateering decision in 1797, the two nations were
engaged in an undeclared maritime war. 259
As the United States became more deeply enmeshed in the
maritime conflict roiling the Atlantic, the courts’ role receded (if only
temporarily 260). With French prizes no longer arriving in United States
ports, there were no more cases for the courts to adjudicate. 261

Letter from Charleston Privateers to National Convention (Apr. 14, 1795), AMAE-MD, 39:8
(complaining of significant financial losses incurred as a result of British litigation).
257. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Nov. 19, 1894, art. 24,
2 Stat. 463 (1795). The treaty was concluded in 1794, but was kept secret by the Washington
administration and not approved by the Senate until July 1795. Fierce opposition to the treaty
among Republicans in the House and the general public delayed implementation for almost a
year. See generally ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 5, at 415–31; Golove & Hulsebosch, supra
note 6, at 1039–61.
258. See Letter from Charles Delacroix to James Monroe (Mar. 11, 1796), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 19, at 732–33 (listing alleged United States treaty violations); Letter from Duhail to
Ministère des Relations Extérieures (Aug. 29, 1796), AMAE-CCC, Baltimore, 1:164 (“[T]oday
our privileges are so imperceptible that it becomes ridiculous to even use the term.”); see
generally ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE
UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797–1801 (1966).
259. The issue that most directly led to the Quasi-War between the two nations was the
United States’ supposed acquiescence in British restrictions on neutral trade, which allegedly
violated the principle of “free ships make free goods” enshrined in the Treaty of Amity. In
retaliation, France declared that it would treat American ships the same way they allowed
themselves to be treated by the British; as a result, French privateers began seizing American
merchant vessels on suspicion of trading with the enemy, and carried them to French-controlled
ports in the Caribbean for condemnation by admiralty courts. DECONDE, supra note 258,
at 9-10.
260. See generally Arlyck, supra note 9 (describing the central role the federal courts played
in U.S. foreign relations in the first four decades after ratification of the Constitution).
261. The federal courts did handle prize cases stemming from captures made by United
States naval vessels during the Quasi-War, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 103 (1801), but the caseload was limited by the fact that Congress only authorized the
seizure of armed French ships, not merchant vessels, An Act Further to Protect the Commerce
of the United States, ch. 68, §§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 578, 578–79 (1798); see also George Lee Haskins
& Herbert A. Johnson, 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–15, 407, 409 (1981) (noting that no prize
cases from the Quasi-War reached the Supreme Court).
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Moreover, because the nation’s “neutral” status effectively ended with
the onset of hostilities with France, the institutional role the judiciary
had assumed during the Neutrality Crisis—as the arbiter of sensitive
disputes implicating foreign relations—effectively ended.
Sorting out the Neutrality Crisis’ doctrinal legacy would take
longer, 262 and at a fundamental level the difficult questions that
animated debate in the Neutrality Crisis are still with us today. To be
sure, the gradual abandonment of privateering in the nineteenth
century has largely obviated the federal courts’ role in regulating the
conduct of maritime warfare. 263 But the basic conundrum with which
judges and elected officials grappled in the 1790s—the proper scope
of judicial involvement in matters implicating foreign affairs—
continues to pose challenges over two centuries later.
IV. A JUDICIAL ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS?
In offering a new account of the Washington administration’s
attempt to recruit the courts into management of the Neutrality
Crisis, this Article seeks first to sharpen our understanding of how the
first generation of federal officials struggled to work out difficult
questions of national governance in the crucible of international
political controversy. The Article demonstrates that standard
presidentialist accounts of early foreign affairs—ones that fail to
recognize the extent to which significant decisionmaking
responsibility was shared between the executive and judiciary—are
incomplete at best and misleading at worst, and that full appreciation
of the complex political and institutional dynamics that pushed the
privateering controversy into the courts offers a different picture of
early inter-branch relations than the one to which we are accustomed.
The account offered here of the complex relationship between the
two branches in the 1790s also points towards a different way of
thinking about that relationship in the present day. While debate on
the role of the courts in foreign affairs generally understands
presidential policymaking and judicial decisionmaking in this area to
262. See, e.g., L’Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 258 (1816) (attempting to reconcile
contradictory precedents from the Neutrality Crisis respecting when the courts of a neutral
nation “may interfere” in case of maritime capture between belligerent nations); see also Arlyck,
supra note 182 (describing Spanish diplomats’ use of federal court litigation in the period after
the War of 1812 to reclaim merchant vessels seized by American privateers working for South
American revolutionary governments).
263. See generally Parrillo, supra note 226 (discussing abandonment of privateering in the
United States and Europe).
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be in opposition, the example of the Neutrality Crisis reminds us that,
under certain circumstances, they might instead interact in
complementary ways.
Modern discussions of the judicial role in foreign affairs—
especially those that have emerged in the last decade in the context of
the global effort to combat terrorism—have largely been structured
around questions of deference. That is: To what extent should a court
confronting a question with implications for United States foreign
relations defer to the views of the executive branch or even abstain
from deciding altogether? 264 At the risk of oversimplification,
scholarship on this question can be roughly divided into two camps.265
One view holds that the executive branch is (and should be) the
primary institution of government through which the nation’s foreign
relations are conducted and that the courts’ role in foreign affairs is
appropriately structured by a norm of judicial deference to executive
branch decisionmaking. 266 This scholarship explains—and often
justifies—executive primacy by invoking the notion of judicial
incompetence in foreign relations, wherein courts have neither the
expertise nor the institutional capabilities necessary to decide difficult

264. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2069 (2007) (“Modern
notions of deference to administrative decisionmakers, developed primarily in other contexts, are
in considerable tension with the historic office of [habeas corpus].”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50 (advancing “a minimalist [judicial] approach to
intrusions on freedom amidst war”).
265. Scholars in this area have in fact staked out a range of positions on the deference
continuum, and several have sought to calibrate the level of judicial deference according to the
substantive matter in question. See Bradley, supra note 13, at 679 (2000) (arguing that Chevronstyle deference to the executive branch legal interpretation is appropriate in many, though not
all, areas); Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive
Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1771–74 (2007) (presenting an “integrated
model of calibrated deference” in treaty interpretation); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of
Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1942–44
(2005) (arguing that courts should defer “according to the degree to which an issue affects
foreign affairs and whether the continuing administration of the treaty at issue is expressly
entrusted to a specific executive branch agency”).
266. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. 1170, 1176 (2007) (“[C]ourts should generally defer to the executive on the ground
that resolving ambiguities requires judgments of policy and principle, and the foreign policy
expertise of the executive places it in the best position to make those judgments.”); Yoo, supra
note 13, at 864–82 (arguing in favor of deference to presidential treaty interpretation).
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foreign affairs questions in ways that adequately protect or promote
national interests. 267
In contrast, a number of commentators have argued against what
they perceive to be excessive judicial deference in foreign affairs, on
the grounds that judicial resolution of certain questions is not only
appropriate as a constitutional matter but also justified on functional
grounds. 268 On these accounts, judicial decisionmaking can serve
national interests in a variety of ways: by protecting civil liberties, 269 by
ensuring inter-branch balance in the face of executive

267. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES
RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 45–60 (1992) (discussing four standard
arguments in favor of judicial abstention in foreign affairs); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New
Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1398 (1999)
(“[Federal courts] lack the information, expertise, unity, and national political accountability to
make foreign relations judgments for the nation.”); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism
in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153,
195–98 (concluding that courts are ill-equipped to resolve foreign affairs cases); Jide Nzelibe,
The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 944 (2004) (“[C]ompared to the
political branches, the courts suffer from peculiar institutional disadvantages that often warrant
absolute deference to the decision of the political branches in most foreign affairs
controversies.”); John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the HelmsBurton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 747, 772 (1997) (“Compared to the
Presidency, the federal judicial system is decentralized, slow, and at times irrational (from a
national security perspective).”); see generally Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The
Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT.
179, 199–202 (2006) (reviewing functional arguments in favor of the executive).
To be sure, those who favor judicial deference to the executive also marshal arguments
grounded in constitutional text and structure, see, e.g., John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and
the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305, 1315–28 (2002), but for the purposes of
the present analysis I leave those to one side and focus on the functional considerations that
often form the core of such views.
268. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 267 (critiquing judicial abdication under the political
question doctrine); David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political
Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439 (1999) (arguing that there is reason to be concerned
about excessive judicial deference in the area of foreign affairs); Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial
Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 805, 813 (1989) (“[T]here is no basis for a
broad rule permitting [judicial] deference or abstention in cases touching on international law
and policy.”); Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, 83 AM.
J. INT’L L. 814, 819 (1989) (“The purported merits of judicial abstention in foreign affairs . . .
shrink under scrutiny, while the drawbacks . . . are substantial.”); Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar
Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1235–49 (2007) (identifying
several areas where substantial judicial deference to the executive is “plainly inappropriate”);
Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1998) (arguing
that certain treaties delegate to the federal courts the law-making power to fill in gaps in treaties).
269. See, e.g., David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual
Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 515–16 (1945).
THE
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encroachment, 270 by signaling compliance with international norms, 271
and even by shaping such norms in ways beneficial to the United
States. 272 There is a general consensus, however, that the central
question to be answered is whether (or when) judicial deference in
foreign affairs is appropriate. 273 In other words, the question is largely
whether executive or judicial authority should prevail. Judicial
deference is also understood by scholars across the spectrum to have
an extensive historical pedigree. 274

270. See Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50 VILL. L.
REV. 25, 27 (2005) (arguing that judicial deference in treaty interpretation is inconsistent with
the judiciary’s critical role as a check on the power of the executive branch); Deborah N.
Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 783, 790 (2011) (proposing an “equilibrium theory” model of limited judicial
deference, in which “part of the judicial role in statutory and treaty interpretation is to aid in
maintaining a structural balance of power” between the branches of government).
271. See Burley, supra note 9, at 476.
272. See Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
1117 (2011).
273. See Charney, supra note 268, at 808–13 (reviewing the merits of eight different
justifications given for judicial deference and abstention).
274. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
132 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that in foreign affairs “the courts are less willing than elsewhere to
curb the federal political branches, are even more disposed to presume the constitutional validity
of their actions and to accept their interpretations of statutes, and have even developed doctrines
of special deference to them”); Bederman, supra note 268, at 1462–66 (1999) (arguing that
judicial deference in treaty interpretation increased during the twentieth century); see generally
supra note 13. However, some scholars who view judicial intervention in foreign affairs more
favorably question the strength of a deferential tradition. See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and
the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1395 (1989) (contending that, in the early nation
period, “review by the courts of executive responses to foreign threats played an important role
in the maintenance of a boundary between constitutional order and emergency power”);
Pearlstein, supra note 270, at 786 (contending that “descriptive claims that the Court invariably
defers to the President in foreign relations law interpretation have always been subject to
challenge”); David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A
Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 505–22 (2007) (contending that the
early Supreme Court took a non-deferential approach to executive branch treaty interpretation);
see also G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations,
85 VA. L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that prior to the New Deal era the executive branch played an
important but, by no means exclusive, role in foreign affairs). In addition, several commentators
have argued that over the last decade the Supreme Court has been markedly non-deferential
towards the executive in national security cases. Cf., e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Foreign
Relations Authority After 9/11, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 119, 122 (2011) (“[I]n every major
case arising out of 9/11, the Court has rejected the position staked out by the executive
branch.”). This reading of the Court’s jurisprudence is disputed by others. See generally JACK
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 135 (2007) (noting that Court decisions regarding
Guantanamo Bay detainees “did not at that time require the President to alter many of
his actions”).
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The story of the Neutrality Crisis suggests that judicial deference
might not always be the best lens through which to examine relations
between the two branches in foreign affairs. As the preceding narrative
makes clear, the Washington administration deliberately sought to
give the courts primary responsibility for addressing foreign claims of
sovereign right that the executive branch was unable and unwilling to
resolve. From the perspective of the executive branch, judicial
decisionmaking was not opposed to presidential authority in foreign
affairs—it was complementary to it.
The
considerations
that
animated
the
Washington
administration’s attempt to recruit the courts into management of the
Neutrality Crisis still obtain today. As explained in Part II, the
administration turned to the courts for two primary reasons: its desire
to deflect responsibility for resolving sensitive foreign relations
problems away from the executive branch; and its inability, from an
administrative perspective, to handle all of the disputes that cropped
up. As to the first, scholars in law and political science have long
recognized that elected officials in both the executive and legislative
branches will often defer to the judiciary to avoid making decisions
that risk displeasing important constituencies. 275 And, as demonstrated
in the Neutrality Crisis, in many cases, elected officials may be
concerned less with the substantive outcome than with the fact that
the courts assume responsibility for deciding difficult questions,276
even if the political benefits prove to be time-limited. 277

275. See E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 73 (1960) (“[T]he displacement of conflicts is a prime instrument of
political strategy.”); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY 143 (2007) (“An active and independent court can assume the blame for
advancing constitutional commitments that might have electoral costs.”); Mark A. Graber, The
Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35,
41 (1993) (“Courts offer . . . opportunities for pushing unwanted political fights off the political
agenda.”). But see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 57–60 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that, under public
choice theory, legislatures will delegate regulation to agencies or courts so as to avoid choosing
between the policy preferences of opposing interest groups).
276. See Graber, supra note 275, at 42 (“[P]oliticians who facilitate judicial policymaking
are frequently more interested in having the justices bear the public responsibility for making
some policy decision than in the particular policy decision that the justices might make.”).
277. See id. at 68 (“Diverting issues to the courtroom may prove to be only a temporary
balm in most cases, but to desperate politicians transitory measures are better than no relief
at all.”).
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These insights have yet to be meaningfully applied in the foreign
relations context, even though other nations can easily be understood
to be a “constituency” that elected officials would prefer not to
antagonize. Critics of judicial involvement in foreign affairs have
ignored the courts’ accountability-diffusing potential, 278 and even
supporters of an expanded judicial role have not seriously taken up the
possibility. 279 Along the same lines, while institutional studies of the
executive branch make clear that, even in the era of the modern
administrative state, presidential capacity to effectuate policy goals are
not infinite, 280 the salience of resource limitations for questions about
the distribution of foreign affairs decisionmaking responsibility has
been largely overlooked. 281
To be sure, the tremendous changes in both executive power and
the United States’ position in the world might reasonably raise doubts
about the relevance of a historical example over two hundred years
old. 282 Perhaps the leader of the world’s sole remaining superpower
simply has no need to share responsibility for decisionmaking in
foreign affairs. And indeed, the massive diplomatic, military, and

278. See Nzelibe, supra note 267, at 989 (“Unlike legal controversies in the domestic
realm, the political branches do not seem to have any need for an impartial tribunal to dispense
judgments regarding the scope of their foreign affairs activities.”). But see JACK GOLDSMITH,
POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 188–201 (2012)
(asserting that judicial review of executive branch counter-terrorism policies has bolstered their
legitimacy); Thomas P. Crocker, Torture, with Apologies, 86 TEX. L. REV. 569, 598 (2008)
(arguing that executive detention at Guantanamo Bay has “greater legitimacy because of the
presence of judicial review”).
279. See supra notes 268–272 and accompanying text. But see Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming
Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J.
INT’L L. 241, 245 (2008) (noting that national governments can strategically benefit from
judicial application of international law by asserting that it is legally constrained from pursuing
actions requested by foreigners).
280. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 107 (2005) (“The budget
and manpower of federal regulatory agencies are generally quite limited, and many agencies
simply lack the capacity to enforce the law adequately.”).
281. See, e.g., Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts:
The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 952 (2011) (failing to include
executive branch resource limitations among functional arguments in favor of judicial
determination of foreign sovereign immunity).
282. See Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 5, 6
(2008) (“[P]ragmatic or consequentialist justifications for originalism are potentially weak in the
area of foreign affairs, particularly given the profound changes over time in the Presidency as an
office, the military and economic strength of the United States, the conduct of war, and the
content of international law.”).
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national security apparatus at the president’s disposal may render any
relief the judiciary might provide with respect to administrative
burdens wholly negligible.
Such arguments have merit, but they do not win the day. Modern
executive branch resources are not infinite, and the executive branch
will often want to tread carefully when the sovereign rights of other
nations are at issue. To take one example, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) transferred responsibility for
sovereign immunity determinations from the executive branch to the
federal judiciary. 283 Prior to FSIA’s passage, the State Department had
effective authority to decide whether a defendant warranted immunity
from suit. 284 But by the 1970s, individualized determinations by
the executive branch had proven to be both administratively
unmanageable and politically unpalatable. 285 By judicializing the
process for determining immunity, the State Department—much like
the Washington administration nearly two centuries earlier—sought
to reassure foreign sovereigns that such decisions would be made
impartially 286 while relieving the executive branch of a significant
diplomatic and administrative burden. 287 It is not difficult to imagine
other modern contexts in which judicial resolution of sensitive

283. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§
1330, 1602–11 (2006)).
284. See THEODORE R. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: AN
ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 268 (1970).
285. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6607 (noting that the Department “does not have the machinery to take evidence, to hear
witnesses, or to afford appellate review” in making sovereign immunity decisions); H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1487, at 7 (stating that the FSIA was intended to “reduc[e] the foreign policy
implications of immunity determinations”); see generally Jamal Greene, Giving the Constitution
to the Courts, 117 YALE L.J. 886, 891–95 (2008) (reviewing WHITTINGTON, supra note 275)
(discussing the political branches’ reasons for empowering courts to make immunity decisions
under the FSIA).
286. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (stating that the FISA was intended to “assur[e]
litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under
procedures that insure due process”).
287. See To Define the Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing
on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser,
Department of State) (“[T]he State Department becomes involved in a great many cases where
we would rather not do anything at all, but where there is enormous pressure from the foreign
government that we do something.”).
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questions implicating foreign affairs might have similar
salutary potential. 288
A different objection to the complementary view of executivejudicial relations in foreign affairs might be drawn from the Neutrality
Crisis itself: that judicial intervention may undermine national
interests, a concern that echoes many of the critiques advanced by
modern scholars. 289 After all, French resentment over the federal
courts’ involvement figured prominently in complaints from France
that the United States was reneging on its treaty commitments, 290 and
shortly after the Supreme Court heard its last privateering case the two
nations were effectively at war. These facts suggest that, unlike
domestic constituents, foreign interlocutors will attribute unfavorable
court outcomes to the government as a whole and that kicking
difficult questions to the courts does nothing to diffuse blame. 291
It is not clear, however, that French resentment over the courts’
involvement in the Crisis is evidence of political failure. In truth,
French officials understood the importance of judicial independence
to American constitutionalism, 292 extolled it as a “sacred maxim”

288. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964) (noting
the State Department’s desire to avoid taking a position respecting a dispute involving the Cuban
government’s sovereign rights); Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
Administration’s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 173
(2004) (noting that both the Carter and Clinton administrations viewed early Alien Tort Statute
cases as generally supporting U.S. foreign policy).
289. See supra note 267.
290. See Letter from Charles Delacroix to James Monroe (Mar. 11, 1796), in 1 ASPFR,
supra note 19, at 732 (listing the federal courts’ assumption of jurisdiction over prizes first
among alleged United States infractions of the treaties); Letter from Pierre-Auguste Adet to
Timothy Pickering (Nov. 15, 1796), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 19, at 579 (same).
291. See Letter from Pierre-Auguste Adet to Timothy Pickering (Nov. 15, 1796), in 1
ASPFR, supra note 19, at 579–83 (accusing the Washington Administration of having
“abandoned French privateers to [the] courts of justice”); Knowles, supra note 272, at 1151–
54 (discussing Chinese government diplomatic complaints over the filing of ATS suits against
Chinese officials in federal courts).
292. See, e.g., Letter from Michel-Ange-Bernard Mangourit to Ministère des Affaires
Étrangères (Feb. 21, 1794), AMAE-CCC, Charleston, 2:204 (recognizing that Americans were
“extremely jealous of the independence of their courts” and would refuse any suggestion of
political interference in judicial proceedings). Furthermore, there is little reason to think that
foreign officials today have a less sophisticated understanding of the extent to which the federal
government is a “we,” not an “it.” See also Jacques deLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and
Foreign Relations: A “Sinical” Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses
Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 545–46, 546 n.211 (2002) (discussing Chinese government
recognition of the separation of powers in the United States). For a classic statement of the
importance of disaggregating governmental institutions in the domestic context, see generally
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common to all “liberal governments,” 293 and were more than willing
to go to court themselves when it served their own interests. 294 In
other words, French officials recognized that separation of powers
meaningfully constrained the executive’s ability to shape litigation
outcomes. 295 In the bigger picture, French complaints about judicial
interference in matters of state were points for debate, not a cause
for war.
More importantly, the referral of privateering disputes to the
courts fulfilled what was evidently its primary function: satisfying
British demands that the federal government provide redress to the
victims of French maritime predations. If nothing else, by pushing the
controversy into the courts, the Washington administration was able
to buy time while a diplomatic solution to the problem of strained
Anglo-American relations—i.e., the Jay Treaty—could be reached. If
the price for that approach was a rupture with France, it was one that
the Washington administration was willing to pay in the long run.
To be clear, the point here is not to suggest that standard critiques
of a judicial role in foreign affairs are categorically misguided. But the
example of the Neutrality Crisis suggests that such arguments may go
too far and fail to recognize the ways in which judicial resolution of
disputes related to foreign affairs can support—rather than
undermine—executive branch diplomacy. If nothing else, the fact that
presidents ancient and modern have at times understood a meaningful
judicial role in foreign affairs to be in the national interest suggests
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
293. Letter from Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph (Sept. 18, 1794) (2 Sans-Culotide
An 2), AMAE-CCC, Philadelphia, 3:84–87.
294. See United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 48–49 (1795) (rejecting a French
request for a writ of mandamus compelling a federal district court to issue an arrest warrant for
a deserter from a French warship); United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121, 129–32 (1795)
(granting a writ of prohibition ordering a federal district court to dismiss a lawsuit against a
French ship of war); Letter from Peter S. DuPonceau to Pierre-Auguste Adet (Aug. 19, 1795),
in 1 DUPONCEAU LETTERBOOKS, supra note 165, at 129–30, 132 (detailing the French role in
Peters in securing the writ from the Supreme Court); Letter from Peter S. DuPonceau to PierreAuguste Adet (Aug. 16, 1795). in 1 DUPONCEAU LETTERBOOKS, supra note 165, at 129–30,
132 (same); see generally Arlyck, supra note 219 (detailing the extensive involvement of French
officials in war-related federal court litigation during the Neutrality Crisis).
295. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph (Sept. 13, 1794), in 1
ASPFR, supra note 19, at 591 (acknowledging that the executive could not “officially interfere”
in a court case in Charleston); Letter from Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph (June 8, 1795),
in 1 ASPFR, supra note 19, at 614–15 (generally acknowledging legitimacy of jurisdiction over
prizes made by privateers armed in the United States).
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that efforts to cabin that role through formal barriers to judicial
decisionmaking may be counterproductive. 296
That said, whatever benefits that might accrue from the courts’
intervention in foreign affairs depend on judicial willingness to accept
that role. As this Article demonstrates, judges in the 1790s were
deeply skeptical about the prospect of becoming enmeshed in disputes
over French privateering. As both a matter of comity and of selfinterest, judicial recalcitrance, especially in the Crisis’s early stages,
lessened the potential for significant judicial decisionmaking.
Accordingly, this Article reminds us that even in the realm of
foreign affairs the judicial role will be structured, at least in part, by
judicial motivations and interests. Again, this point is well recognized
in the legal and political science literature studying inter-branch
relations in the domestic context, 297 but is often overlooked in
scholarship addressing the courts’ role in foreign affairs, 298 though it
is not obvious why the courts would weigh their institutional interests
differently in foreign affairs. As commentators have pointed out,
federal courts are equipped with a number of different doctrinal tools
to avoid hearing cases that implicate sensitive and difficult foreign
relations questions. 299 Moreover, the concerns that motivated judicial
296. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013)
(advancing a territorially-bounded view of the federal courts’ jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Statute); Brief for the Respondents at 10–13, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03334, 03-343), 2004 WL 425739, at *11–12 (arguing that United States courts lack jurisdiction
over challenges to the legality of the detention by the military at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Bellia
& Clark, supra note 9 (arguing that suits between aliens are categorically not cognizable under
the original understanding of the Alien Tort Statute); Goldsmith, supra note 267, at 1400
(advocating for a formalist jurisprudence in foreign affairs cases reliant on “well-defined rules
that [do] not leave much room for judicial discretion”).
297. See David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 113, 132 (1993) (“[E]very decision by the Court involves the Court’s institutional
interests to some degree.”); see generally Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory
of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases,
6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990); Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial
Politics?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 191 (2012); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993).
298. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 13, at 659–63 (2000) (listing reasons for judicial branch
deference to the executive branch in foreign affairs, but not including considerations of judicial
self-interest); Charney, supra note 268, at 808–13 (similar).
299. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that exhaustion, forum
non conveniens, and comity can be used to remove cases implicating foreign relations from
judicial purview); Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151 (2009)
(noting that comity, forum non conveniens, and the political question doctrine can all serve as
means by which federal courts can decline jurisdiction over cases implicating foreign affairs).
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skepticism in the 1790s—that judicial resolution of privateeringrelated disputes was in tension with international legal norms,
undermined international comity, and threatened the courts’
institutional well-being—are no less salient today. 300 In short, a central
lesson of the Neutrality Crisis might be that the most significant
obstacle to a more robust judicial role in foreign affairs may in fact be
the courts themselves.
CONCLUSION
Though the Neutrality Crisis effectively came to a close in 1797,
its effects continued to be felt for years afterward. In 1799, Chief
Justice Ellsworth presided over a criminal trial in federal circuit court
in Hartford. The defendant, Isaac Williams, was an American accused
of violating the Jay Treaty between the United States and Great
Britain by commanding a French privateer that attacked British
merchant vessels in the Caribbean in 1797. 301 In denying the validity
of Williams’s defense that he was in fact a French citizen, Ellsworth
reminded his audience of the difficult position the nation had been in
during the Crisis: “We wished to have nothing to do with the war,”
he recalled, “but the war would have something to do with us.” 302
In seeking to “have nothing to do with the war” between France
and Great Britain, the Washington administration turned to the
courts, promoting judicial resolution of disputes arising from French
privateering as the proper means by which foreign claims to
government intervention were to be addressed. Federal court
adjudication of such cases served as a means of deflecting executive
300. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(asserting that courts adjudicating ATS cases should consider “whether the exercise of
jurisdiction . . . is consistent with those notions of comity that lead each nation to respect the
sovereign rights of other nations”); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 144–
45 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that corporate liability for human rights violations was insufficiently
established in customary international law to serve as a basis for federal court jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Statute); Louis Henkin, Lexical Priority or “Political Question”: A Response, 101
HARV. L. REV. 524, 530 (1987) (criticizing judicial abstention under the political question
doctrine as “a means of escape for fearful judges unwilling to address challenges to governmental
usurpation of authority in foreign affairs”); Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80
U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (2013) (discussing the Supreme Court’s increasing receptivity to
arguments that it should avoid deciding cases in ways that “open the floodgates of litigation”);
McGinnis, supra note 13, at 306 (positing that, under rational choice theory, the Supreme Court
will likely defer to the executive on questions relating to the conduct of war, out of concern that
“[a]ny inept decision . . . may erode the Court’s prestige and endanger its public respect”).
301. Williams’ Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330, 1331 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17,708).
302. Id.
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responsibility for responding directly to diplomatic complaints, while
at the same time providing the representatives of foreign powers an
ostensibly impartial forum for the resolution of wartime legal disputes.
In so doing, the courts played a central role in translating United
States neutrality from abstract policy into a practice of governance.
Ellsworth’s characterization of the recalcitrant national attitude
towards the Neutrality Crisis applied equally to the judiciary he
supervised during that period. Federal judges exhibited a marked
ambivalence about the central role they were asked to assume in
resolving claims arising from the conduct of maritime war between
belligerent empires. Though in certain respects judges—and the
justices of the Supreme Court in particular—sought to assist the
administration in its attempts to maintain neutrality, their decisions
made clear that the executive branch’s policy priorities would need to
be balanced against judicial concerns over international legitimacy and
the negative effects an expansive role in foreign affairs could have on
the courts themselves. Accordingly, the Washington administration’s
turn to the courts was not mandated by a preexisting constitutional
consensus regarding the salutary role the judiciary would play in
foreign affairs. It was instead a pragmatic—and only partially
successful—response to challenging domestic and international
political circumstances. The particulars of the judicial role in foreign
affairs would therefore continue to be contested.
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